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THE RE-GIFT OF LIFE:
CAN CHARITY LAW PREVENT FOR-PROFIT FIRMS
FROM EXPLOITING DONATED TISSUE AND
NONPROFIT TISSUE BANKS?
Robert A. Katz*
INTRODUcrION
In the United States, a billion dollar industry exists to recover
human tissues (e.g., bone, skin, and heart valves) from deceased per-
sons and process them for therapeutic implantation into living per-
sons.' This industry is driven by an uneasy combination of selflessness
and self-interest. It obtains its basic inputs from altruistic individuals 2
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1. See Robin R. Young, FDA Issues Final Good Tissue Practices Rule, Nov. 29, 2004, http://
www.healthpointcapital.com/researchl/2004/11/29/fdaissues-final-good-tissue-practicesrule/in-
dex.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
2. In a telephone survey of 507 next of kin who donated loved ones' tissues, "46.6% stated
their desire to help others, 19.2% said they knew their loved one wanted to donate, and 14.2%
felt their loved one would [have] want[ed] to donate." Michael P. Scott et al., Adequacy of
Informed Consent Process for Tissue Donation: A Survey of Donor Families 57 (University of
Florida Tissue Bank, Aug. 2000) (on file with author). See also John P. Moyer, Andy's Gift. A
Donor Family's Perspective, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE
87, 88 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE] (au-
thor's son would have wanted his tissues to be used to relieve other peoples' pain; "He was so
giving and caring").
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who donate cadaveric tissue 3 to charitable nonprofit organizations 4
known as tissue banks.5 These entities then transfer raw tissue to enti-
ties that process it into implantable material called allografts. 6 Many
of these processors are for-profit businesses; others are set up as non-
profit organizations. Some of these firms earn significant revenues
from their processing activities. 7 The largest for-profit processor, Re-
generation Technologies, Inc. (RTI), reported net revenues of $92.7
million in 2004.8
For-profit processors are a mixed blessing for the tissue industry.
On one hand, they have pioneered some of the industry's most impor-
tant technological advances and helped fuel its rapid growth. In re-
cent years, for example, scientists have learned how to make skin
grafts that will not be rejected by a recipient's body by removing the
donated skin's cells while preserving its vascular channels. 9 The lead-
ing manufacturer of acellular dermal material is LifeCell Corporation,
a for-profit business.' 0 On the other hand, some people are troubled
by the fact that for-profit businesses enrich their owners by processing
tissue. Some commentators believe that "huge earnings are inappro-
priate in a domain bolstered by altruism and selflessness,"1I and that
"[large scale financial operations may overshadow the underlying al-
3. See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text. In 1999, an estimated 20,000 people be-
came tissue donors upon death. TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TIssuE, supra note 2, at xi.
4. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. The terms "nonprofit" and "charitable" are not
synonymous, but for convenience, I will use these terms interchangeably unless otherwise indi-
cated. For discussion of the differences between these terms, see infra notes 272-286 and accom-
panying text.
5. I define the term "tissue bank" as an entity that recovers donated tissue. I use this term
more narrowly than is customary in the tissue industry, which applies it to entities that either
recover or process tissues, or both. See, e.g., Martha W. Anderson & Renie Schapiro, From
Donor to Recipient: The Pathway and Business of Donated Tissues, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN
TISSUE, supra note 2, at 3 (defining "tissue bank" as "[a]n organization that recovers, processes,
stores, and/or distributes tissues for clinical transplantation") (internal citation omitted).
6. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T60.e299 (last visited Feb. 7, 2006) (defin-
ing "allograft" as "a living tissue or organ graft between two members of the same species; for
example, a heart transplant from one person to another").
7. See infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
8. Regeneration Technologies, Inc., RTI Announces 2004 Year End, Fourth Quarter Results:
Company Posts Record Net Revenue, Pursuing Strategic Alternatives to Enhance Shareholder
Value, Feb. 17, 2005, http://www.rtix.com/news-fullstory.cfm?item=1239&lasturl=/news-listing.
cfm%3Farchive=yes.
9. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
11. Nancy Herin, Tissue Donor-to Be One or Not-That Is the Question, at 3 (Spring 2004),
http://www.funerals.org/maryland/tissuenewsletter.pdf.
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truistic nature of tissue donation."12 A report prepared by the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) explains
this ambivalence:
Today's tissue banking industry and the beneficial uses of human
tissues and related products have become more complex and costly.
New ways of using tissue for medical treatment have been devel-
oped. Tissue banking has been infused with capital and en-
trepreneurial practices. Processed tissue often is marketed and sold
like any other medical product. For some, these practices call into
question the non-profit basis of the tissue banking community.13
Some industry actors fear that publicizing the involvement of for-
profit businesses in the tissue industry will discourage donations.14
This fear is not ungrounded: one suspects that if more people knew of
this involvement, they would bar for-profit firms from processing their
donations, or refuse to donate tissue altogether. The Christian Cen-
tury, a leading journal for American Protestants, 5 asserts that
[wihen a family gives permission for the removal of tissues and or-
gans from a loved one who has died, it does not imagine it is provid-
ing raw material for a profit making industry .... People who are
happy to offer their heart to save a life are not necessarily eager to
donate their skin to .. .[increase] someone else's bank account.16
Unease over for-profit involvement in the tissue industry has sparked
demands to publicize this involvement. In California, state law re-
quires tissue banks to inform potential donors that for-profit busi-
nesses process raw tissue, and separately allow donors to withhold
12. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFORMED CONSENT IN TISSUE DONATION: EXPECTA-
TIONS AND REALITY, at ii (2001), http://www.fda.gov/cber/tissue/infrmcnsnt.pdf. [hereinafter
HHS INFORMED CONSENT].
13. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Scott D. Boden, M.D., Electronic Comments on proposed Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) Regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 486.342, at 27 (May 2, 2005), http://www.
cms.hhs.gov/eRulemaking/Downloads/3064%20P%2035-79.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) [here-
inafter Boden Comments] (opposing proposal to require providing potential tissue donors with
"information (such as for-profit or nonprofit status) about organizations that will recover, pro-
cess and distribute" donated tissue. Boden stated: "Inevitably, if the proposed language is
adopted, consenting individuals may be forced to restrict the use of their loved ones' tissues
either a for-profit or a non-profit entity. My fear is that the overwhelming majority will choose
non-profit entities ...."). Id.
15. E-mail from Heidi Baumgaertner, Advertising Manager, The Christian Century, to Robert
Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis (Jan. 4, 2006, 14:36 CST) (on file with author) ("The Christian Century is considered
the journal of record for American Protestants.").
16. THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 669 (June 21-28, 2000). See generally Christian Century, http://
www.christiancentury.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
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consent for this. 17 The federal government has proposed regulations
to require similar disclosures.18
Public relations aside, is there anything wrong with for-profit busi-
nesses earning profits by processing donated tissue? This Article ar-
gues that there is nothing inherently unlawful, unethical, or otherwise
improper about for-profit involvement in the tissue industry. The Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA or the Act)' 9-the statu-
tory charter of the United States's transplantation system-creates a
scheme that, if realized, would eliminate tension between selflessness
and self-regard in the transplantation system. In practice, however,
the tissue industry uses donated resources for private gain. This Arti-
cle uses economic analysis to explain NOTA's philanthropic goals and
how these are thwarted. It then considers whether charity law can
help advance these goals.
NOTA bans the sale of body parts for use in transplantation by
prohibiting their transfer for "valuable consideration. ' 20 This prohibi-
tion reflects several concerns-most notably (for our purposes) the
belief that transplant body parts "should be given as a gift, either to a
specific individual or to society at large."' 21 NOTA can be seen as an
instrument for redistributing these gifts from donors to allograft recip-
ients, the donors' intended beneficiaries. Although NOTA prohibits
their transfer for valuable consideration, it does not-indeed cannot-
erase the economic value of body parts in general, and cadaveric tis-
sue in particular.22 This value arises from the willingness and ability
of some people to pay for allografts made from such tissue.23
Although NOTA prohibits the sale of body parts, it also recognizes
that if transplantations are to occur, intermediaries must be fairly
compensated for recovering tissues and processing and developing al-
lografts. To this end, the Act permits "reasonable payments" associ-
ated with these activities.2 4 In economic terms, reasonable payments
enable an intermediary to recoup its actual expenses and earn "nor-
mal" profits-the returns it would have earned had it invested in a
17. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301 (1984).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a); Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301(a).
21. Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan. 1995)
(quoting Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519,
1622 (1990)). NOTA's prohibition reflects several other concerns. See infra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 208-215 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 208-215 and accompanying text.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2); Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301(c)(2). See infra notes 64-6 and accom-
panying text.
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comparably risky venture. 25 This compensation cap is essential to
NOTA's scheme for redistributing the value of donated tissue. When
intermediaries earn no more than normal profits, they are rewarded
for adding value to tissue, but are not paid for the tissue itself. If
every intermediary earns no more than normal profits, the tissue's ec-
onomic value is preserved intact for allograft recipients. This value is
reflected in what recipients do not pay because raw tissue is gifted
rather than sold.26 Conversely, when intermediaries receive unrea-
sonable payments ("supernormal" profits27), they earn more than
their expenses and opportunity costs-they are paid for the tissue it-
self. In this way, supernormal payments enable intermediaries to cap-
ture the tissue's value.
If followed, NOTA's scheme would transfer the tissue's value to al-
lograft recipients and fairly compensate intermediaries for adding
value to it. The presence of for-profit businesses in the tissue industry
would not interfere with the Act's philanthropic goals. Moreover, if
the markets for raw and processed tissues were perfectly competitive,
market forces would produce the results that NOTA intends as a mat-
ter of course, thereby making the Act unnecessary. 28
In practice, NOTA's philanthropic goals are not fully realized for
several reasons. First, the government does not enforce the Act-it
takes no steps to prevent intermediaries from selling tissue or earning
supernormal profits (which here amounts to the same thing).29 The
burdens of nonenforcement, however, fall more heavily on donors and
recipients than intermediaries. Intermediaries know how to look after
themselves-they can be counted on to seek payment for their activi-
ties. Unless NOTA is enforced, however, only self-restraint can stop
them from seeking supernormal profits. Second, the tissue markets
are imperfectly competitive in various ways: some processors have
greater access to raw tissue than others; some use patented technology
to produce unique allografts with few substitutes; and some cultivate
more brand loyalty for their allografts. 30 These conditions enable ad-
vantaged processors to earn supernormal profits.
Can charity law help illuminate or advance NOTA's philanthropic
goals? There are good reasons to think so. Charity law and NOTA
PhnrP ecrtnin ends: each seek to delich'r thbl, resourccs to a class
25. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 223-268 and accompanying text.
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of beneficiaries and prevent these resources from being diverted or
unduly exploited. This Article examines NOTA's philanthropic goals
from a charity law perspective and asks two questions: Do any actors
or arrangements in the tissue industry violate charity law and, if so,
can charity law be used to stop such violations? This exercise identi-
fies what charity law can and cannot do on NOTA's behalf, suggests
ways that charity law could better serve NOTA, and points to certain
problems with NOTA and in charity law that should be scrutinized
and perhaps amended.
This Article's charity law analysis is organized around two doc-
trines. The first is the nondistribution constraint, which prohibits a
nonprofit organization from distributing profits to its controllers. It
applies most clearly to nonprofit tissue banks that are controlled by
for-profit processors as subsidiary or captive entities. The Article ex-
plains how the nondistribution constraint (also known as the ban on
private inurement) can protect captive tissue banks and their re-
sources from being exploited by their for-profit controllers.
The second charity law doctrine is the ban on private benefit, which
restricts the secondary benefits that charitable activity can confer on
noncharitable parties. 31 For example, when a nonprofit organization
improves facilities at a public lake, it also advances the private inter-
ests of people who own lake front property.32 The ban on private ben-
efit puts a spotlight on tissue banks that supply raw tissue with its
economic value intact. Such transfers are troubling because they give
the tissue's for-profit transferees an opportunity to capture the tissue's
value for private gain.33 This scenario points out the limitations of
charity law as a tool for advancing NOTA's aims: once charitable re-
sources leave a nonprofit's hands, charity law can do relatively little to
prevent transferees from exploiting these resources. 34 The surest way
to prevent for-profit processors from selling donated tissue is to stop
supplying them with tissue. Yet this drastic measure is unwise because
of the many health benefits and other advantages that for-profit
processors provide.
Analyzing NOTA from a charity law perspective draws attention to
the Act's understanding of exploitation, commonly defined as "[t]he
31. The ban on private benefit applies to nonprofit organizations that are exempt from paying
federal income tax under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The ban denies tax exemp-
tion to nonprofits whose charitable activities excessively or purposely benefit private interests.
32. See infra notes 347-349 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 421-428 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 421-428 and accompanying text.
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use for unacceptable purposes of an economic resource . . . . 35 Under
NOTA, the relevant charitable resources (cadaveric tissues) are ex-
ploited by commodifying them-treating them as materials that can
be bought and sold. Under this view, any intermediary that sells (cap-
tures the economic value of) tissue is an enemy: the intermediary's
status as a nonprofit or for-profit entity is irrelevant. Under charity
law, by contrast, charitable resources are exploited when they are
siphoned off or excessively applied for private gain. From this per-
spective, an entity's legal form is decisive. When a for-profit business
sells an asset, it will likely use the net profits to enrich its owners and
investors. When a nonprofit entity sells a charitable resource, it must
use the net profits to advance its charitable mission. The former ex-
ploits; the latter does the Lord's work.
Analyzing NOTA from a charity law perspective also underscores
flaws in its unwieldy scheme for achieving its philanthropic goals.
NOTA proposes to deliver a gift (the tissue's economic value) by pass-
ing the tissue through the hands of every party that stands between
donors and allograft recipients. This plan gives each intermediary an
opportunity to appropriate gifted resources for itself. For this plan to
succeed, every intermediary must transfer the donated tissue's eco-
nomic value intact to the next intermediary-it must re-gift this
value36-until it is distributed to allograft recipients. Because NOTA
is unenforced, however, that is unlikely to happen.
What is to be done? In the concluding section, the Article surveys a
range of options-enforce NOTA, abolish it, or maintain the status
quo. If we take NOTA's philanthropic goals seriously, however, we
35. OXFORD ONLINE REFERENCE, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T88.e783 (last visited Feb. 7, 2006) (defin-
ing "exploitation").
36. See Word Spy, http://www.wordspy.com/words/regift.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) (defin-
ing "regift" as "v. To give as a gift something that one received as a gift"). According to Word-
spy, the word "regift" was popularized by the TV show Seinfeld in the episode titled The Label
Maker, which first aired on January 19, 1995. Id. Word Spy quotes the relevant dialogue as
follows:
George: The wedding is off. Now you can go to the Super Bowl.
Jerry: I can't call Tim Whatley and ask for the tickets back.
George: You just gave them to him tvO days ago, he's gotta give you a gracc pcriod.
Jerry: Are you even vaguely familiar with the concept of giving? There's no grace
period.
George: Well, didn't he regift the label maker?
Jerry: Possibly.
George: Well, if he can regift, why can't you degift?
Jerry: You may have a point.
George: I have a point, I have a point.
20061 949
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should consider another option: authorize nonprofit tissue banks to
sell donated tissue to for-profit processors, thereby redistributing the
tissue's economic value from the latter to the former. This change
could have significant and beneficial consequences. As nonprofit or-
ganizations, tissue banks must use any new income to further their
missions. They could use additional resources to educate the public
about donation and transplantation, provide bereavement care for do-
nor families, improve the quality of their facilities, and subsidize trans-
plants for people who need but cannot otherwise afford them. They
could also direct the production and development of allografts based
on medical need and social concerns, rather than profit.
The thought of authorizing anyone to sell human tissue-even non-
profit organizations-may be jarring. Absent effective enforcement
of NOTA, however, the most pressing, normative question is not
whether human tissue should be sold, but who should capture its
value. As between nonprofit entities and for-profit businesses, donors
would likely choose the former, as they are more secure and direct
vehicles for altruistic transfers. From the donors' perspective, a par-
tial revocation of NOTA might be an improvement over the status
quo.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the legal regime
that regulates the United States's system for transplanting human or-
gans and tissue.37 Part III surveys the tissue industry, its leading ac-
tors, and the path that cadaveric tissue travels from donors to allograft
recipients. 38 It pays special attention to efforts by certain for-profit
processors to obtain raw tissue by starting or affiliating with nonprofit
tissue banks. Part IV uses economic analysis to explain NOTA, its
scheme for achieving its philanthropic goals, and how this scheme
fares under conditions of perfect and imperfect competition. 39 Part V
analyzes the tissue industry from a charity law perspective and consid-
ers whether and how charity law can help implement NOTA's
scheme. 40 The Conclusion observes that the tissue industry, by its suc-
cess and rapid growth, has exacerbated the tension between its selfless
and self-interested elements.
37. See infra notes 41-95 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 96-194 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 195-268 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 269-438 and accompanying text.
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II. THE REGULATION OF HUMAN ORGAN AND
TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION
This Part surveys the legal regime that regulates the United States's
system for transplanting human organs and tissue. This regime autho-
rizes people to make anatomical gifts and prohibits them-or any
party-from selling organs and tissues for use in transplantation. As
compared to the organ industry, the tissue industry is relatively unreg-
ulated. Most notably, federal law does not require the tissue indus-
try's leading actors (e.g., tissue banks and processors) to be nonprofit
or tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.). In practice all tissue banks are nonprofit organizations, and
in most places they are not required to publicize the involvement of
for-profit businesses in the industry.
A. The Power to Donate Body Parts for Use in Transplantation
Cadaveric human tissue must be obtained with a person's advance
consent (to take effect upon death) or the consent of a decedent's
next of kin (the donor family).41 This principle was established by the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which has been adopted in
some form by every state and the District of Columbia. 42 The UAGA
recognizes a competent adult's right to authorize an anatomical gift
upon his or her death for use in transplantation, therapy, education,
and research. 43 It also empowers next of kin to donate all or part of a
decedent's body absent knowledge of the decedent's opposition to do-
nation.44 In many jurisdictions, a person's next of kin cannot set aside
41. A decedent whose body or body parts are donated is called a "donor," although the term
can be somewhat misleading. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 66 (5th ed. 2001) (observing that it is a "risky overextension of consent
language [to refer] to a cadaveric source of organs for transplantation as a 'donor' when he or
she never 'donated,' that is, never chose to donate"). Within the industry, a donor's next of kin
is called a "donor family." See, e.g., National Kidney Foundation, What is the National Donor
Family Council?, http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/donorFamilies/about.cfm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2006).
42. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT general statutory note (1968); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr
ACT general statutory Iic (1987); see also Collavito v. NewYork Organ Donor N Inc.,
356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the original UAGA in 1968 and issued a revised ver-
sion in 1987. A committee of this organization is currently drafting revisions to the 1987 version.
See NCCUSL, Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, http://www.
nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspxtabindex=0&tabid=59 (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
43. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 2(a), (3) (1968); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIF-r ACT §§ 2(a),
6(a) (1987).
44. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(b) (1968); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIvr AcT § 3(a) (1987).
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the decedent's expressed wish to make an anatomical gift.45 The
drafters of the UAGA hoped that its widespread adoption would "en-
courage the making of anatomical gifts," and thereby "facilitat[e]
therapy involving such procedures. '46
B. The Ban on the Sale of Organs and Tissues for Transplantation
Federal law prohibits the purchase or sale of transplant body
parts. 47 Section 301(a) of NOTA, which Congress enacted in 1984,
states that "[it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consider-
ation for use in human transplantation .... "48 The Act defines the
term "organ" to include both tissues and solid organs (e.g., kidneys
and hearts).49 NOTA's prohibition applies to "any person," a cate-
gory that includes both natural persons (e.g., donors50 and allograft
recipients) and legal persons (e.g., tissue banks and processing firms).
45. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §29-2-16-2.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 2000) (next of kin "have no legal
standing or authority to... prevent the donor's anatomical gift from being made"). In practice,
however, a person's desire to make an anatomical gift may be vetoed by the would-be donor's
next of kin after the death. Elizabeth J. Church, Organ Donation and Transplantation, 73 RADI-
OLOGiC TECH. 537, 552 (2002). Participants in the transplantation process strongly advise poten-
tial donors to discuss their wishes regarding donation with family members. The American
Association of Tissue Banks notes:
It is important to let close family members know your feelings regarding donation.
Physicians and medical caregivers pay close attention to the wishes of the family. If
you wish to donate, inform your family and have at least one family member witness
your signature on an organ/tissue donation card ....
American Association of Tissue Banks [hereinafter AATB], Facts About Organ and Tissue Do-
nation, http://aatb.org/aatbdon.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
46. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gir ACT prefatory note (1987), 8A U.L.A. 20 (1993) (quoting UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (1968)).
47. The original UAGA (1968) did not expressly address the legality of the purchase or sale of
body parts. The revised UAGA (1987) incorporates NOTA's prohibition on the purchase or sale
of a body part for transplantation or therapy. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Givr ACT § 10(a) (1987), 8A
U.L.A. 25 (1987).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000); Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 301(a). This restriction only applies to
transfers that affect interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2000). NOTA does not address
the legality of selling and purchasing body parts for use in education and research.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (defining the term "human organ" to include tissues such as "bone
marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin," as well as solid or vascular organs such as the "kidney,
liver, heart, lung, [and] pancreas"). NOTA was not intended to prohibit the sale of blood and
blood derivatives, "which can be replenished and whose donation does not compromise the
health of the donor." S. REP. No. 98-382, at 16-17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3975, 3982. Even so, the term tissue "is not a precise concept" and could also include gametes,
embryos, stem cells, and others. Norman Fost, Developing Hospital Policy: The University of
Wisconsin Experience, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 2, at 160, 161.
50. Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "donor" to refer to both the decedent whose
body parts are donated and the next of kin who agree to donate the decedent's body parts. See
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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NOTA's ban on the sale of transplant body parts reflects a range of
concerns, including: (a) the belief that such parts should be given as
gifts;51 (b) the belief that human body parts should not be viewed as
commodities; 52 (c) the desire to promote fair access to donated body
parts53 and reduce the role of wealth in determining their allocation;54
and (d) concerns that poor people, driven by economic necessity,
might endanger themselves by selling a kidney or other body part.55
This Article focuses mainly on the first concern, which informs the
Act's efforts to make the transplantation system a secure vehicle for
donor philanthropy.
NOTA's prohibition on selling tissue resembles a covenant that
runs with land and whose restrictions bind the land's present holder
and all subsequent takers indefinitely.56 Under NOTA, every person
who receives body parts for use in transplantation is subject to the
Act's restrictions. Because NOTA is a statute, all persons who handle
51. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
52. S. REP. No. 98-382 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982-83; OXFORD REF-
ERENCE ONLINE, THE CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oxfordreference.
com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T23.e11261 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (defining
"commodity" as "a raw material ... that can be bought and sold").
53. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-382, at 4, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3978. The Act
"seeks to support development of a rational and fair national health policy regarding organ
transplantation." Id. (emphasis added). See also United Network for Organ Sharing, Newsroom
Factsheets, Monitoring Compliance with Organ Transplant Policy in the United States, http://
www.unos.org/inTheNews/factsheets.asp?fs=8 (last visited Aug. 17, 2004) ("Organ donation is
dependent upon the public's trust that the nation's transplant system is operated fairly. Organ
transplant policy is based on the latest medical and scientific findings and continually refined to
be as equitable as possible given the severe shortage.").
54. This is a recurring theme in United States discourse on healthcare. See, e.g., Ellis Henican
& David Zinman, Dukakis' Healthy America Plan, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 1988, at 5 ("[Michael]
Dukakis drew a standing ovation in his campaign speech at Western Kentucky University, in
Bowling Green, Ky., when he said the first question a sick person should hear is not 'How can
you pay?' but 'Where does it hurt?"'). Dukakis, a former governor of Massachusetts, was the
Democratic nominee for President in 1988. He lost.
55. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE GREAT TRADEOFF 19 (1975)
(arguing that people have a "right not to act out of desperation").
56. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (8th ed. 2004)(defining "covenant" to include "cove-
nant running with the land," which is "[a] covenant that, because it relates to the land, binds
successor grantees indefinitely. The land cannot be conveyed without the"); see
also Gouveia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that debtor cannot sell land free
and clear of restrictive covenants). Professor Roger Bernhardt explained that
[t]he important consequence of a covenant running with the land is that its burden or
benefit will thereby be imposed or conferred upon a subsequent owner of the property
who never actually agreed to it. Running covenants thereby achieve the transfer of
duties and rights in a way not permitted by traditional contract law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 56, at 363 (quoting ROGER BERNHARDT, REAL PROP-
ERTY IN A NUTSHELL 212 (3d ed. 1993)).
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body parts for transplantation have notice-actual or constructive 57-
of its provisions.
Persons who violate NOTA may be fined up to $50,000 and impris-
oned for up to five years.58 The U.S. Government has rarely enforced
the Act, and never has done so successfully. 59 Although NOTA has
never resulted in criminal penalties, an Arkansas state court has in-
voked it to defeat a donor's payment demand for tissue she supplied.
In Wilson v. Adkins,60 a woman agreed to supply bone marrow to her
ailing sister in exchange for her nephew's promise to pay her $101,500
as compensation "for the risk, difficulties, and insurance consequences
of [her] marrow donation."' 61 After supplying the tissue but receiving
no payment, the woman sued her nephew for breach of contract. 62
The Arkansas Court of Appeals rebuffed the woman's complaint on
grounds that the contract violated NOTA. 63
Although NOTA prohibits the sale of transplant organs and tissues,
it permits some commerce among intermediaries in the transplanta-
tion system. Section 301(c)(2) accomplishes this by defining the term
"valuable consideration" to exclude "reasonable payments associated
with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preserva-
tion, quality control, and storage of a human organ [or tissue] .... ,64
Neither NOTA nor courts have defined what constitutes reasonable
payments to intermediaries for their activities associated with trans-
plantation.65 Section 301(c)(2) of the Act also defines "valuable con-
57. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF LAW, http://www.oxfordreference.com/
views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T49.e769 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (defining "con-
structive notice" as "[kinowledge that the law presumes a person to have even if he is actually
ignorant of the facts. A purchaser of unregistered land has constructive notice of all matters that
a prudent purchaser would discover on inspection of the property or proper investigation of the
title.").
58. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000).
59. In 1998, Frank Fu and Cheng Yong Wang were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation and charged in federal court with conspiracy to sell kidneys and corneas taken from exe-
cuted Chinese prisoners for use in transplantation in violation of NOTA § 301(a). A year later,
the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment on Due Process and Sixth
Amendment grounds. See United States v. Wang, No. 98 Cr. 199 (DAB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19895 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1998); United States v. Wang, No. 98 Cr. 199 (DAB), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13481 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1998); United States v. Wang, No. 98 Cr. 199 (DAB), 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2913 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1999).
60. 941 S.W.2d 440 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).
61. Id. at 441.
62. Id. at 440. Her complaint also alleged fraud and detrimental reliance. Id.
63. Id. at 443 (affirming the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2000).
65. On September 30, 2005, I performed a terms-and-connectors search for "('national organ
transplant act' or NOTA) and 'reasonable payments"' in the LEXIS database "Federal & State
Cases, Combined." The only case that this search retrieved was Wilson v. Adkins, discussed
supra notes 60-63, where the Arkansas Court of Appeals stated: "While [NOTA] does allow
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sideration" to exclude "the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages
incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the dona-
tion of the organ. ' '66 This apparently refers to living donors of kid-
neys, bone marrow, and other expendable or replenishable body
parts.
C. Regulating the Organ Transplantation System
NOTA created the legal framework for the national organ trans-
plantation system. The Act provides for the establishment of a na-
tional network to facilitate the recovery, transportation, and
allocation of organs.67 It requires this network-called the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)-to be organized
as a nonprofit entity and to be governed by representatives of various
actors in the organ industry and the general public.68
The OPTN's most prominent members are Organ Procurement Or-
ganizations (OPOs). OPOs are responsible for identifying potential
organ donors and soliciting and recovering donated organs. Federal
law requires OPOs to be nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations. 69
There are currently fifty-eight OPOs in the United States,70 each with
a designated service area that may cover all or part of a state. 71 Each
OPO is the only entity authorized to recover transplant organs within
its designated area.72
The federal government uses the Medicare program to induce hos-
pitals to promote organ and tissue donation. In order to participate in
the program, a hospital must inform the families of potential donors
,reasonable payments' for the cost of the procedure and incidental expenses, it is clear that
$101,500.00 [which the nephew promised to pay his aunt in return for donating bone marrow to
his sick mother] is not payment for reasonable incidental expenses" but rather compensation for
the bone marrow itself. Wilson, 941 S.W.2d at 442.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 274(b)(1)(A)-(B). Since 1986, the OPTN has been operated by the United Network
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a nonprofit organization based in Richmond, Virginia. See The
United Network for Organ Sharing, Who We Are, http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter UNOS, Who We Are].
69. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 486.306(a) (2005) ("To be designated as the OPO
for a service area, an organization must... [b]e a nonprofit entity that is exempt from Federal
income taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986."). For a discussion of
the distinction between nonprofit, charitable, and tax-exempt organizations, see infra notes
272-290 and accompanying text.
70. UNOS, Who We Are, supra note 68. This number is current as of January 8, 2006. Id. For
a list of these OPOs, see UNOS, Membership, Organ Procurement Organizations, http://www.
unos.org/members/directory.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
71. UNOS, Who We Are, supra note 68.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(b)(2) ("The Secretary may not designate more than one organ pro-
curement organization for each service area .... "); 42 C.F.R. § 486.302.
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about donation for transplantation and notify the designated OPO
about the death or imminent demise of potential donors.73 Addition-
ally, hospitals and OPOs must cooperate with one or more tissue
banks to facilitate tissue donations.7 4
D. Regulating the Tissue Transplantation Industry
1. General Oversight
Whereas the organ industry is strictly regulated, federal law says
relatively little about how the tissue industry should be structured.
The law does not require tissue banks, processors, and other in-
termediaries to be nonprofit organizations or tax-exempt under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3). The law does not grant tissue banks a monopoly over tis-
sue recovery within a designated area. In many places, multiple tissue
banks compete for referrals of potential donors.75 There are over 150
tissue banks in the United States.76 Government regulation of the tis-
sue industry focuses mainly on health and safety concerns. The
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires tissue
banks and processors to follow procedures for preventing the spread
of communicable diseases through transplanted tissue.77 Only a hand-
ful of states require tissue banks to be licensed, and even fewer states
inspect banks. 78
The tissue industry regulates itself to some extent. The most impor-
tant source of self-regulation is the American Association of Tissue
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1); 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.45, 485.643.
74. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(I).
75. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 4. In Wisconsin, three nationwide tissue banks
compete for potential donors. See, e.g., Ron Seely, Tissue Bank Criticized for Offer of Trip to
Coroners: Some Charge That It Seems to Be an Inducement for Referral of Cadavers to the Bank,
WIs. ST. J., Aug. 27, 2005, at Al, http://www.madison.com/toolboxlindex.php?action=printme&
ref=archives&storyURL=/Archives/read.php?ref=wsj:2005:08:27:487397:FRONT. Some tissue
banks obtain donor referrals from sources other than hospitals that handle cadavers, such as
coroners, medical examiners, and funeral directors. When multiple tissue banks compete for
donors, they find different ways, large and small, to influence sources. In April 2005, for exam-
ple, the nonprofit tissue bank American Tissue Services Foundation (ATSF) offered coroners
and medical examiners a free three-day trip to Las Vegas to attend an educational workshop on
tissue donation. Id. In Minnesota, three tissue banks compete for donors: ATSF, LifeSource,
and the Minnesota Lions Eye Bank, and each provided refreshments at a 2005 seminar for Min-
nesotan coroners and medical examiners. See Brochure, 22nd Annual Forensic Science Seminar
2 (Oct. 4-5, 2005). http:/Ihome.earthlink.net/-mc-mea/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/2005_fi-
nalseminar-brochure.pdf.
76. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OVERSIGHT OF TISSUE BANKING, at ii (2001), http://
www.fda.gov/cber/tissue/ovrst010l.pdf (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter HHS OVER-
SIGHT]. In researching the oversight system for tissue banking, the HHS Office of Inspector
General identified 154 tissue establishments.
77. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2005).
78. HHS OVERSIGHT, supra note 76, at 5-6 (internal citations omitted).
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Banks (AATB). 79 The AATB is a "scientific, not-for-profit, peer
group organization" that promotes safe and high-quality tissues and
tissue-based products for transplantation.8 0 Membership in the
AATB is voluntary, as is accreditation for compliance with its stan-
dards.81 Most of the leading tissue banks and processors are AATB
members.8 2 Eighty-nine tissue establishments have obtained AATB
accreditation.8 3
2. Disclosure of For-Profit Involvement in the Tissue Industry
As a general rule, each tissue bank decides for itself whether to in-
form donor families about the involvement of for-profit businesses in
the tissue industry. Some tissue banks routinely disclose this informa-
tion,84 while others do not unless specifically asked.85 The AATB be-
lieves that disclosure should be left to each tissue bank's discretion, to
be exercised in a sensitive and responsible manner.8 6 In some cases,
says the AATB, it may be appropriate to disclose this information
even without an inquiry, "depending upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the donation and the potential gift(s) .... ",87
Among regulators, there is growing interest in requiring tissue
banks to disclose for-profit involvement. This interest reflects a per-
ceived gap between how the tissue industry operates and how donors
79. See generally AATB, http://aatb.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
80. Id.
81. See Anne Paxton, Cache Register-The Risky Business of Tissue Banking, May 2003, http:/
/www.cap.org/apps/docs/cap-today/feature-stories/tissuebanking.html (tissue banks "are under
no obligation to meet the standards or policies set by the [AATB], and for many banks there is
no incentive to seek accreditation") (quoting George F. Grob, HHS Deputy Inspector General)
(alteration in original).
82. Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Bob Rigney, CEO, American Association of
Tissue Banks), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/052401-psiRigney.htm.
83. AATB, Accredited Bank List, http://www.aatb.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
84. See, e.g., Mark Katches et al., Tissue Bank Offers Nonprofit Option, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Oct. 19, 2000, available at http://www.ocregister.com/features/body/body010l9cci.shtml
(reporting that Musculoskeletal Transplant Foundation (MTF), a nonprofit tissue processor, an-
nounced "that it will tell grief-stricken families about profits and offer a choice to keep donated
body parts out of the hands of a profit-making company").
85. See, e.g., Mark Katches et al., Donors Don't Realize They Are Fueling a Lucrative Busi-
ness. ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 16, 2000, available at http://www.ocregister.com/features/
body/dayl.shtml (noting that Nancy Holland, Chief Executive of University of Florida Tissue
Bank, said that "telling potential donors about profits and ties to [for-profit] companies would
complicate the consent process. 'We're already talking with someone who is in a state of grief,
and we just thought it was too much information to impose on them at that time .... '").
86. Am. Ass'n Tissue Banks et al., Model Elements of Informed Consent for Organ and Tissue
Donation, Nov. 30, 2000, available at http://www.aatb.org/model.htm.
87. Id.
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believe it operates.88 A 2003 California Senate report asserted that if
donors are not informed about for-profit involvement, "it may be dif-
ficult to assert that genuine informed consent was obtained." 89 The
California state legislature subsequently enacted a statute mandating
consent procedures that: (a) advise donors that "tissue banks work
with both nonprofit and for-profit tissue processors ...";90 and (b)
"allow the donor or donor's representative to withhold consent for...
[d]onated tissue to be used by for-profit tissue processors ... ."91 This
statute has reportedly increased the number of donors who withhold
consent for for-profit involvement. 92 In September 2005, twenty-four
legislators in the Wisconsin state legislature introduced a bill very sim-
ilar to the California statute. 93 In February 2005, HHS proposed a
rule that would require OPOs to ensure that donor families receive
information about the "profit or non-profit status .. . [of] organiza-
tions that will recover, process, and distribute tissue .. . -94 This pro-
posed regulation has not been finalized. 95
III. THE TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION INDUSTRY
The tissue industry is large-it is estimated that over $1 billion was
spent in 2004 to purchase human tissues to implant in 900,000 pa-
tients96-and growing at an estimated rate of ten to fifteen percent
each year.97 The tissue industry has outpaced the organ industry in
many respects. More people are eligible to donate tissues than or-
88. HHS INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 12, at ii ("[T]he reality of tissue banking raises
some underlying tension with [donor] families' assumptions.").
89. SHERRY AGNOS, CAL. SEN. OFFICE OF RES., TISSUE DONATIONS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN
OVERSIGHT, REGULATION AND CONSENT 11 (2003), http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/reports/reports-
by-subj/health/tissuedonationsreport.pdf.
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7158.3(b)(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 2006).
91. Id. § 7158.3(b)(2)(C). Tissue banks and their agents violating the statute face civil liability
and loss of their licenses. Id. § 7158.3(b)(4), (c).
92. E-mail from Karen Richards, Program Manager, University of California San Francisco
(UCSF) Tissue Bank, to Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies,
Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis (Aug. 15, 2005, 16:16 EST) (on file with author)
("In 2004, approximately 13% of our families opted out for Profit and 15% in 2005.").
93. Assem. Bill 659, 2005 Legis., § 11 (Wis. 2005), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/
2005/data/AB-659.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2005). The bill was introduced by eighteen state rep-
resentatives and co-sponsored by six state senators. Id.
94. 70 Fed. Reg. 6086, 6119 (Feb. 4, 2005) (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 486.342(5) (2005)).
95. Telephone Interview with Donald McLeod, Public Affairs Specialist, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Off. of External Affairs (Mar. 3, 2006).
96. Young, supra note 1.
97. Aaron Smith, Tissue From Corpses in Strong Demand: Market for Allografts Keeps Grow-
ing, Outpacing Supply, CNN MONEY, Oct. 5, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/04/news/mid-
caps/allograft/index.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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gans, 98 more tissues are donated than organs, 99 and each donor can
yield more tissues than organs for transplantation.100 This Part pro-
vides an overview of the tissue industry and how it operates. It also
discusses the experiences of two for-profit processors that have forged
close ties with or actually formed nonprofit tissue banks in order to
ensure access to raw tissue.
A. The Path From Tissue Donors to Allograft Recipients
This section surveys the path that tissue travels from donors to al-
lograft recipients, focusing on tissue banks and processors. Allografts
are marketed and distributed to healthcare providers through a vari-
ety of channels, including processors, tissue banks, and third-party
distributors. 10 1
1. The Donation Process
In the hospital context, the recovery of cadaveric tissue typically
begins when a hospital notifies the OPO of a patient's actual or immi-
nent death.10 2 Outside the hospital context, tissue banks may learn
about potential donors from medical examiners, coroners, and funeral
home directors. 10 3 The OPO or tissue bank, if a separate entity, then
assesses whether the patient or decedent might be a suitable tissue
donor.10 4 If the answer is yes, the OPO or tissue bank asks the poten-
tial donor's family to consent to donation.10 5 Once this consent is ob-
tained, the tissue must be recovered within twenty-four hours of the
98. "Of the estimated 1.2 million people who will die in hospitals each year, 11,000-14,000"
will meet the requirement to become an organ donor, but 100,000 will meet the requirement to
donate tissue. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 5.
99. TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TissuE, supra note 2, at xi (stating that in 1999, an estimated
20,000 people became tissue donors upon death, "more than triple the number of cadaveric
organ donors").
100. Id. (explaining that tissue recovered from one donor can go "to as many as 50 to 100
recipients").
101. see, e.g., Andrison .& Schapifu, supru i ute 5, at 7; RTI, Mrdical Counuiiity: DitributolI
Information, http://www.rtix.com/medical/distributor.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
102. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a) (2005).
103. See, e.g., Regeneration Technologies Donor Services, Medical & Funeral Professionals,
https://www.rtidonorservices.org/en/professionals/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
104. 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(1) ("The OPO determines medical suitability for organ donation
and, in the absence of alternative arrangements by the hospital, the OPO determines medical
suitability for tissue and eye donation ...."); see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
105. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 5.
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donor's death. 0 6 The tissue bank bears the costs associated with the
recovery process.10 7
Many families derive comfort from donating a loved one's body
parts for transplantation and from contemplating how the donation
will improve or save the recipients' lives.10 8 OPOs and tissue banks
provide donor families with various "aftercare" resources designed to
help them though the donation process, funeral arrangements, grief,
and other end-of-life concerns.'0 9 These may include resources on
dealing with loss and grief, informal counseling, support groups, donor
recognition events, letters of appreciation from recipients or general
information about them, medals, keepsake boxes, and teddy bears. 10
2. Tissue Banks
Some tissue banks recover many types of tissues for transplantation,
including bones,"' tendons, ligaments, cartilage, heart valves,"12
skin,113 eyes, and corneas.' 14 Other tissue banks recover a specific
type of tissue only, such as skin or eyes. OPOs or tissue banks initiate
the extensive process for ensuring that donated tissue will not transmit
disease. 115 This entails, inter alia, reviewing a donor's medical records,
106. Id. at 6.
107. See LifeLink Foundation, Myths and Facts About Organ and Tissue Donation, http://
www.lifelinkfound.org/myth.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (stating that "[d]onor families are not
charged for the medical costs associated with organ and tissue donation").
108. Id. ("Studies show that donation most often provides immediate and long-term consola-
tion. Donation can be especially comforting when the death is unexpected and the donor is
young.").
109. See, e.g., LifeCenter Northwest, Family Support Services, http://www.lcnw.org/services/
family/index.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (explaining that this OPO provides services to donor
families for a year following the donation).
110. See, e.g., Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 8; Indiana Organ Procurement Organiza-
tion, About IOPO, http://www.iopo.org/aboutiopo.asp#assistance (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
Some staff members of the Indiana Organ Procurement Organization (IOPO) "contribute
money to fund educational scholarships for immediate family members of Indiana organ/tissue
donors .... " Indiana Organ Procurement Organization, Scholarship Fund, http://www.iopo.org/
scholarship-fund.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
111. LifeLink Foundation, About Tissue Donation, http://www.lifelinkfound.org/tdonation.
asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) ("An estimated 700,000 bone grafts are done yearly. Banked bone
is used to replace bone that has been destroyed by tumors, trauma, and infection, allowing limbs
to be spared that would otherwise have to be amputated.").
112. Id. ("The heart valves may be used from hearts which can not be used for transplanta-
tion. Ideally, the heart valves should be obtained from a heart-beating cadaver, however, the
heart valves of a non heart-beating cadaver of up to 12 hours can also be considered for donation
if there is a documented time of death.").
113. Id. ("Transplanted skin is used as replacement tissue over 1,000,000 times per year.
Three quarters of this usage occurs in life-saving circumstances such as severe burns.").
114. Id. ("Corneas are used in over 44,000 transplant procedures yearly to restore sight.").
115. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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inquiring into a donor's social history for high-risk behaviors for trans-
missible diseases, and testing a donor's blood for HIV, hepatitis, and
syphilis. 116
All tissue banks are organized as nonprofit and charitable entities
under state law, and most are tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 117
Tissue banks may be structured in a variety of ways. Some are inde-
pendent entities that operate one or more offices."t 8 They may also
belong to a network or alliance of tissue banks. 119 Others are con-
trolled by a separate nonprofit entity, such as an GPO120 or a non-
profit processor, 121 or by a for-profit processor. 122
A tissue bank can arrange for processing in one of three ways.
First, the tissue bank can transfer tissue to a processor, outright and
with no strings attached, in exchange for a fee to cover tissue recovery
services. 123 The processor then determines how to process the tissue,
which products to manufacture, how to distribute the tissue, and so
on. The tissue bank's service fee is known as a Standard Acquisition
116. See, e.g., Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 6. One tissue bank explained:
Every donor is thoroughly screened and tested before donation can take place. This
screening includes comprehensive medical and social histories, including high-risk be-
haviors for transmissible diseases that automatically eliminate any possibility of dona-
tion. Potential donors with histories of any condition that can affect the quality and
long-term performance of the bone and/or tissue are also excluded.
MTF, Donation FAQs: Who Donates Bone and Tissue Allografts?, http://www.mtf.net/donor/
index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
117. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 3-4. RTI Donor Services, a charitable nonprofit
tissue bank, is taxable-it is not tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See infra notes 174-194
and accompanying text. For discussion of the distinction between nonprofit, charitable, and tax-
exempt status, see infra notes 272-290 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., IOPO, About IOPO, http://www.iopo.org/aboutiopo.asp (last visited Feb. 8,
2006) (explaining that the IOPO "is a nonprofit health service dedicated to advancing organ,
tissue, and eye donation throughout Indiana. IOPO has regional offices in Fort Wayne, South
Bend, Evansville and Indianapolis to serve the people of Indiana and more than 130 Indiana
hospitals.").
119. In 1994, a consortium of three separate nonprofit tissue banks in St. Louis, Denver, and
Chicago formed AlloSource, a nonprofit processor. See AlloSource, About Us: Company and
Industry Milestones-1994, http://www.allosource.org/about-milestones.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2006). Each of AlloSource's three tissue banks-Mid-America Transplant Services of St. Louis,
Donor Alliance of Denver, and Gift of Hope Organ and Tissue Network of Chicago-appoints
one or more representatives to AlloSource's board of directors. See AlloSource, About Us:
Board of Directors, http://www.allosource.org/about-directors.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
120. See, e.g., LifeNet, http://www.lifenet.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (describing LifeNet,
the designated OPO for most of Virginia, as "the nation's largest nonprofit, full-service organ
donation agency and tissue banking system").
121. See, e.g., infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
122. RTI, a for-profit processor, controls RTI Donor Services. See infra notes 174-194 and
accompanying text.
123. The processor is bound by NOTA's restrictions even if it does not promise the tissue
bank that it will comply with them. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Charge (SAC). 1 24 This fee permits the tissue bank to recoup its actual
outlays on tissue recovery, aftercare, education, and "other costs asso-
ciated with operating a tissue recovery program."'1 25 Typically, these
fees also include a small percentage or margin that provides the tissue
bank with excess revenue for future expansions, savings, and other
needs.126
In the second model, a tissue bank contracts with another entity to
process the recovered tissue according to the tissue bank's specifica-
tions. 127 The processor later returns the processed tissues to the tissue
bank. In this way, the tissue bank retains "title" to the underlying
tissues, even when these are in the processor's custody.1 28
In the third model, a single entity (or group of related entities) both
recovers raw tissue and processes it.129 This entity retains both cus-
tody and control over the tissues until distributed to healthcare prov-
iders. The components of this entity may be exclusively nonprofit
(i.e., a nonprofit entity operates both tissue banking and processing
operations),'1 30  or both nonprofit and for-profit (i.e., a for-profit
processor and a subsidiary nonprofit tissue bank).13 1 In theory, this
entity could be exclusively for-profit, as the law does not require tis-
sue banks to be nonprofit.132
3. Tissue Processors
Processors transform raw tissue into allografts for implantation.
Historically, the tissue industry was relatively small and dominated by
124. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 10.
125. Id. See also supra notes 109-110, 115-116 and accompanying text.
126. Anderson & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 10, 12-13. This margin, I argue below, corresponds
to the economic concept of normal profits. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Press Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech and Musculoskeletal Transplant Foun-
dation Sign New Five Year Agreement (Mar. 27, 1997), http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm.
Osteotech, a for-profit processor, and MTF, a nonprofit processor and tissue-banking entity,
signed an agreement "for Osteotech to continue to be the exclusive processor of musculoskeletal
tissue procured and distributed by" MTF. Id.
128. The tissue bank can then distribute the allografts through third-party distributors or di-
rectly to healthcare providers. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 7-8.
129. See, e.g., Community Tissue Services, About Community Tissue Services, http://www.
communitytissue.org/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (Community Tissue Services, a
nonprofit tissue bank and processor, "serves the public through recovery, processing and distri-
bution of human tissue grafts used for transplantation"); Community Tissue Services, Processing
Tissue Grafts, http://www.communitytissue.org/processing/index.html ("All musculoskeletal and
skin tissue grafts procured by each branch [of Community Tissue Services] are processed at the
Dayton, OH location and then returned to the branches for distribution.").
130. This is true of the nonprofit Community Tissue Services. Id.
131. See infra notes 174-194 and accompanying text.
132. Cf supra notes 68-69 (explaining that federal law requires the OPTN and OPOs to be
organized as nonprofit organizations).
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nonprofit entities.1 33 Over the past two decades, it has become a com-
petitive, multi-million-dollar industry increasingly dominated by for-
profit businesses. 134 These businesses have played a leading role in
the industry's technological advancements and dramatic growth.135
This section discusses three kinds of allografts and processors that
produce them: cryopreserved heart valves, demineralized bone matri-
ces, and acellural dermal tissue. As this discussion demonstrates, a
processor's access to proprietary technology can significantly affect its
fortunes.
a. Heart Valves
Surgeons use cadaveric human heart valves to treat patients with
defective heart function. 136 CryoLife, Inc., a for-profit firm founded
in 1984, was the first company to commercially develop a process for
cryopreserving (preserving through freezing) heart valves for trans-
plant. 137 The company boasts "thirteen exclusive cryopreservation
patents .... ,,138 At one time, CryoLife was the undisputed leader in
the market for transplant heart valves, with an estimated eighty-three
percent market share.1 39 After a series of missteps and setbacks, in-
cluding the distribution of infected tissue, 140 the firm's market share
fell to thirty to forty percent.1 41 CryoLife's troubles have increased
demand for heart valves supplied by competing processors, including
133. Martha W. Anderson & Scott Bottenfield, Tissue Banking-Past, Present, and Future, in
TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE, supra note 2, at 14, 14.
134. Id. The website of one for-profit distributor of processed tissue tells prospective custom-
ers that "[wie recognize that you have the opportunity to'choose a tissue bank that you feel best
meets your needs or the needs of the surgeons at your contracted hospitals." Bone Bank Al-
lografts, http://www.bonebank.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2004).
135. See Frost, supra note 49, at 164.
136. LifeLink Foundation, About Tissue Donation, http://www.lifelinkfound.orgftdonation.
asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) ("Heart valves are used in cardiovascular surgery for patients with
valvular disease.").
137. CryoLife, Corporate Profile, http://www.cryolife.com/corporate/mainnew.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2006).
138. CryoLife, A Brief History, http://www.cryolife.com/corporate/historynew.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2006).
139. Robin R. Young, CryoLife Posts Anemic 4th Quarter / Predicts Comeback in 2004, Jan.
12, 2004, http://www.healthpointcapital.com/research/2004/01/12/cryolife-posts-anemic_4th-
quarter predicts comeback in_2004/index.php.
140. Id. See, e.g., David McNaughton, CryoLife Recall Cost $27 Million; FDA Action Leads to
Loss, ATLANTA J.-CONsT., Oct. 30, 2002, at 1C; 60 Minutes II: What Killed Brian Lykins? (CBS
television broadcast, May 15, 2002), transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
05/14/60II/main509045.shtml?CMP=ILC-SearchStories.
141. Young, supra note 139.
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for-profit Regeneration Technologies, Inc. (RTI) and nonprofit
LifeNet. 142
b. Demineralized Bone Matrix for Spinal Fusion Surgery
Cadaveric tissue can be used for spinal fusion, 143 a procedure that
welds vertebrae together as treatment for spinal injuries, slipped disks,
scoliosis, and other conditions. 144 This procedure can be performed
using a material known as demineralized bone matrix (DBM). 145
DBM is prepared by combining demineralized bones (bones with
most of their minerals removed) with other substances. 146 DBM en-
hances spinal fusion by providing a medium for bone-forming cells to
travel to the bone defect site 147 and by serving as a scaffold to support
the regeneration of new bone. 148 Some types of DBM also stimulate
cells in the bone defect site to convert into bone-forming cells.1 49
The largest supplier of DBM in the United States is the for-profit
Osteotech, Inc.' 50 When Osteotech began selling DBM in 1991 under
142. Id. See RTI, Allografts: Cardiovascular Allografts: Cardiac, http://www.rtix.com/prod-
ucts/cardiac.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); see also LifeNet, LifeNet Tissue Services: Cardi-
oGraft, http://www.accesslifenet.org//allografts/cardiograft/index.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
LifeNet distributes CardioGraft line of cryopreserved pulmonary tissue allografts.
143. AlloSource, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.allosource.org/allo-faq.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006) ("Spinal fusion is currently the number one allograft application.").
144. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Spinal Fusion, http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/
fact/thr-report.cfm?Thread ID=156&topcategory=spine (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (defining
"spinal fusion").
145. Brett Peterson et al., Osteoinductivity of Commercially Available Demineralized Bone
Matrix: Preparations in a Spine Fusion Model, 86A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2243, 2243 (2004)
("demineralized bone matrix preparations are available as alternatives or supplements to" bone
harvested from patient's own body).
146. Id. at 2244. Demineralized bone can be combined with glycerol, hyaluronic acid, or cal-
cium sulfate to produce DBM. Each combination may yield DBM with different healing proper-
ties. Id.
147. Id. ("[T]he osteoconductivity of the demineralized bone matrix-carrier complex may be
an important factor [in determining the efficacy of a demineralized bone matrix as a bone-graft
substitute or extender] since this property promotes migration of osteoprogenitor [bone-form-
ing] cells to the bone defect site.").
148. J.F. Keating & M.M. McQueen, Substitutes for Autologous Bone Graft in Orthopaedic
Trauma, available at http:/lwww.findarticles.com/p/articlesmi-qa37671is-200101/ain8930230
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006) ("Osteoconductive materials have no capability to form bone or
induce its formation. ... [But they] provide an inert biocompatible scaffold, which local osseous
tissue can utilise to regenerate living bone.").
149. See generally Peterson et al., supra note 145.
150. HealthPoint Capital, GenSci Set to Emerge From Bankruptcy With $50 Million in Cash,
Over $23 Million in Sales and a New DBM Product, Sept. 8, 2003, http://www.healthpointcapital.
com/research/2003/O9lO8/gensci set-to-emergejfrom-bankruptcywith50million in cash
over_23_million in sales and a new dbm-product/index.php.
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the Grafton label,' 5 ' it was "the first tissue made available as a com-
mercially promoted 'product.""152  Osteotech's dominance of the
DBM market can be partly attributed to its patented innovations,
whose infringement the company blocked at least twice. 153 In recent
years, Osteotech has faced growing competition from other proces-
sors' DBM products, which have trademarked labels and allegedly
distinctive qualities.154
c. Acellular Dermal Tissue
The for-profit LifeCell produces an acellular dermal tissue called
AlloDerm.155 It is produced from cadaveric human skin by removing
the cells responsible for rejection, while preserving the tissue's vascu-
lar channels and other properties. 156 Once AlloDerm is implanted in
the body, it revascularizes and is remodeled into the patient's own
tissues.157 AlloDerm can be used to replace lost dermis in burn vic-
tims, repair the abdominal walls of hernia patients, and reconstruct
breasts following mastectomy. 158 It can also be used for certain cos-
metic procedures, such as reducing the appearance of wrinkles and
151. Osteotech, Tissue Forms and Products, http://www.osteotech.com/prodgrafton.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006).
152. Anderson & Bottenfield, supra note 133, at 19.
153. Press Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech Awarded Damages in Its Patent Infringement
Lawsuit Against GenSci (Dec. 12, 2001), available at http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm;
Press Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech Settles Claims Against DePuy in Patent Infringement
Suit (Nov. 10, 1999), available at http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm.
154. See, e.g., RTI, Allografts: General Orthopedic Allografts: DBM, http://www.rtix.com/
product,ds/godbm.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); Robin R. Young, The Pathos of Osteotech,
Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.healthpointcapital.comlresearch/2004/08/02/the-pathos of osteotech/
index.php (the "key point of differentiation" for DBM produced by RTI, the for-profit proces-
sor, is the "sterility of its tissues" due to its patented "BioCleanse system"); see also MTF, Tissue
Forms and Distribution, http://www.mtf.org/tissue/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (firm
produces DBX brand of MTF, which "is quickly becoming the surgeon's #1 choice for DBX
formulations"); Wright Medical Technology, Biologics: Allomatrix Injectable Putty, http://www.
wmt.com/Physicians/Products/Biologics/ALLOMATRIXInjectablePutty.asp (last visited Feb. 10,
155. See generally LifeCell, http://www.lifecell.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
156. LifeCell, AlloDerm Benefits, http://www.lifecell.com/products/53/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2006).
157. LifeCell, Products, FAQs, http://www.lifecell.com/products/138/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2006).
158. LiFECELL CORP., FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2004), available at http://www.lifecell.
com/downloads/annual/2004%2OAnnual%20Report%20with%2010K.pdf [hereinafter 2004 AN-
NUAL REPORT].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:943
creases,1 59 augmenting lips to give them "a fuller, more sensual ap-
pearance," 160 and increasing the circumference or girth of penises.' 6'
LifeCell is the only commercial processor of acellular skin for trans-
plantation,162 and the demand for AlloDerm has grown considera-
bly.1 63 LifeCell has "built an excellent reputation with surgeons as the
leading supplier of soft tissue allograft that is safe, flexible and useful
in a wide variety of indications." i 64 AlloDerm has been "gain[ing]
surgeon champions at what appears to be accelerating rates. 1 65
LifeCell has cultivated surgeon loyalty by educating surgeons on the
benefits and use of AlloDerm for various procedures. 66
159. See Shioma, Cymetra, http://www.shioma.com/cymetra-injection-harlingen-procedures-
shioma-4.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
160. See Daniel I. Shapiro, AlloDerm ... It's a Natural, http://www.aestheticsurg.com/al-
loderm.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). But see 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 17
("Although we do not promote the use of our human tissue products for cosmetic applications,
clinicians may use our products in applications or procedures that may be considered
'cosmetic.'").
161. See, e.g., New York Phallo, Allograft Dermae Matrix Grafts (Alloderm), http://www.
newyorkphalloplastyl.com/phallo-allo.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) ("Dr. Whitehead has
used Allograft Dermal Matrix Grafts (Alloderm) exclusively in all of his patients [for penis
widening surgery] for six years because of the superior results ....").
162. Robin R. Young, The Fog of Allograf Innovation, Feb. 9, 2004, http://www.healthpoint-
capital.com/research/2004/02/09/the-fog-of-allograft-innovation/index.php ("[A]ll of these [al-
lograft] products (excepting LifeCell's soft tissues [including AlloDerm]) are available from
numerous sources."). See also University of Toledo, Skin Tissue Engineering, http://www.
bioe.eng.utoledo.edu/adms-staffs/akkus/4740_2004_WEB/www/Companies.htm (last visited Feb.
6, 2006) (listing companies other than LifeCell that offer engineered skin tissue). None of the
other companies offer acellular skin.
163. AlloDerm experienced a seventy-six percent increase in third quarter sales in 2005 ($19.3
million) over the prior year's sales during the same period ($11 million). This followed a sev-
enty-one percent increase in third quarter sales of AlloDerm in 2004 ($11 million) over sales
during the same period in 2003 ($6.4 million). Press Release, LifeCell, Lifecell Reports Record
Third Quarter 2005 Results; Product Revenues Up 62% in the Quarter (Oct. 26, 2005), http://
lifecell.com/downloads/press/2005-10-26.pdf; Robin R. Young, Seventy One Percent Alloderm
Jump Fuels LifeCell's Third Quarter, Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.healthpointcapital.com/research/
2004/11/03/seventy one-percent-alloderm jump-fuels lifecellsthird-quarter/index.php.
164. Robin R. Young, RTI Unveils Key Surgical Product Innovation, June 28, 2004, http://
www.healthpointcapital.com/research/2004/06/28/rti-unveils-key-surgical-product-innovation/
index.php.
165. Young, supra note 163.
166. Id. LifeCell's website offers educational videos containing scenes from surgical proce-
dures involving AlloDerm, abstracts of relevant medical articles, clinical case studies, and
monographs. See generally LifeCell, Products, http://lifecell.com/products/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2006).
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B. Vertical Integration in the Tissue Industry
Tissue processors are sometimes unable to meet the demand for
their products due to a limited supply of raw tissue.1 67 According to
nonprofit processor AlloSource, "the number of [tissue transplanta-
tion] procedures is limited by the availability of donor tissue," and
"[tlhere is simply not enough to go around."168 To secure and expand
their access to raw tissues, some processors have made special ar-
rangements with particular tissue banks. As part of these arrange-
ments, a tissue bank may commit to supplying a processor with raw
tissue for a period of time.' 69
At least two for-profit processors, Osteotech and RTI, have started
nonprofit tissue banks in order to secure a steady and robust supply of
tissue for processing. In 1987, Osteotech spent $10 million to create
Musculoskeletal Transplant Foundation (MTF), a nonprofit organiza-
tion that manages a large number of tissue banks.170 Since its found-
ing, MTF has entered into a series of agreements to supply Osteotech
with tissue,17' and currently provides two-thirds of Osteotech's tissue
needs. 172 Although Osteotech helped create MTF, it does not control
MTF. Rather, MTF is an independent entity that negotiates agree-
167. See, e.g., Press Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech Enters Into New Long-Term Process-
ing Agreement With MTF and Settles Patent Lawsuit with MTF and Synthes (June 7, 2002),
http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm ("[N]otwithstanding the historical growth of our
Graftech(TM) Bio-implants [tissue forms], there remains a large unmet demand that we have
not been able to meet due to limitations of tissue supply.").
168. AlloSource, Allografts-Improving Quality of Life, http://www.allosource.org/aboutal-
lografts.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
169. RTI, for example, signed a five-year agreement with Southeast Tissue Alliance, Inc.
(SETA), a nonprofit tissue bank, wherein SETA committed "to send human donated tissue to
RTI for preparation into allograft implants." RTI, RTI, Southeast Tissue Alliance Extend Tissue
Recovery Agreement (Jan. 25, 2004), http://www.rtix.com/news-fullstory.cfm?item=1226&las-
turl=/Newslisting.cfm%3Farchive=yes. In 2002, LifeNet, a nonprofit tissue bank and processor,
signed a five-year agreement with Osteotech to supply the for-profit processor with sterilized
tissue that Osteotech would then use to finish bio-implants for spinal fusion procedures. Press
Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech Announces New Tissue Resources and Marketing Agree-
ment With LifeNet (Jan. 8, 2002), http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm.
170. MTF does not recover tissue directly from donors; it collects raw tissue from a network
of twenty-eight tissue banks. MTF, Organizational Profile: Company Overview, http://www.mtf.
org/organ/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
171. See, e.g., Press Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech and MTF Sign a Second Processing
Agreement (Dec. 28, 2004), http://osteotech.com/finnews.htm; Press Release, Osteotech, Inc.,
supra note 167; Press Release, Osteotech, Inc., Osteotech and MTF Enter Into New Five-Year
Agreement (Sept. 11, 2000), http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm; Press Release, Osteotech,
Inc., Osteotech and Musculoskeletal Transplant Foundation Sign New Five Year Agreement
(Mar. 27, 1997), http://www.osteotech.com/finnews.htm.
172. Robin R. Young, MTF Extends Its Dominance of Allograft Industry, Nov. 22, 2004, http://
www.healthpointcapital.com/research/2004/11/22/mtf_extendsitsdominance-of-allograft-in-
dustry/index.php.
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ments with Osteotech at arm's length. This was vividly demonstrated
in 2005 when MTF unsuccessfully attempted to acquire Osteotech by
offering to purchase all of Osteotech's outstanding stock.' 73
In 2003, RTI formed Regeneration Technologies Donor Services,
Inc. (RTI Donor Services), 174 a nonprofit tissue-banking organiza-
tion. 175 According to its website, RTI Donor Services is an "(AATB)
accredited tissue recovery organization that works to enhance the
lives of others by providing families the option of tissue donation. '176
It "supports [its donor families'] wishes, while serving as responsible
stewards of donated human tissue gifts. ' 177 It also provides aftercare
services to donor families and promotes donation awareness in the
community.178
RTI controls RTI Donor Services 179 and provides it with an annual
operating budget. 180 Insiders refer to RTI Donor Services as an "affil-
173. Id. Osteotech's management successfully resisted this unsolicited, hostile takeover bid.
John McCormick, Osteotech: Hostile to Shareholders?, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.healthpoint-
capital.com/research/osteotech/index.php; John McCormick, M TF Withdraws Bid for Osteotech,
Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.healthpointcapital.com/research/2005/10/18/mtfwithdraws-bid-for
osteotech/index.php.
174. This organization is sometimes called "Regeneration Technologies Donor Services" and
other times "RTI Donor Services." Compare Regeneration Technologies Donor Services, http://
www.rtidonorservices.com/en/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (referring to organization as "Regener-
ation Technologies Donor Services"), with Regeneration Technologies Donor Services, About
Us, http://www.rtidonorservices.com/en/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (referring to organi-
zation as "RTI Donor Services").
175. RTI, Regeneration Technologies Announces RT1 Donor Services, http://www.rtix.com/
news-fullstory.cfm?item=699&lasturl=/news-listing.cfm%3Farchive=yes (last visited Mar. 29,
2006) [hereinafter Announces RTI Donor Services] ("RTI Donor Services will work with the
approximately 30 recovery agencies that provide tissues such as bone, tendons, ligaments, heart
valves and vascular tissue to Regeneration Technologies for preparation into biological, allograft
implants.").
176. Regeneration Technologies Donor Services, About Us, http://www.rtidonorservices.coml
en/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
177. RTI, Donor Services, http://www.rtix.com/donorservices (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
178. Announces RTI Donor Services, supra note 175.
179. In RTI Donor Services's annual report for 2004, the introductory "Message from RTI
Donor Services" was written by Roger W. Rose, Executive Vice President of RTI and its former
Vice President of RTI Donor Services. RTI DONOR SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, http://
www.rtidonorservices.org/en/pdfs/RTI%2OAnnual%2OReport%202004%205.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter RTI 2004 ANNUAL REPORT]; RTI, Company, Company Leadership,
Executive Officers, http://www.rtix.com/company/executives.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). In
this message, Rose referred to RTI Donor Services in the first person plural, as in "[w]e have a
new logo," and "our American Association of Tissue Banks-accredited recovery services ... 
RTI 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra (emphasis added).
180. E-mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, Manager of Corporate Communications, RTI, to
Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis (Feb. 9, 2006, 14:51 EDT) (on file with author) ("RTI provides RTI Donor
Services with an annual operating budget .... ").
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iate" of RTI,181 but "subsidiary" is the more precise term.182 RTI's
managers believe that this arrangement with RTI Donor Services
gives their firm a competitive edge over other processors. As Richard
R. Allen, RTI's then Chief Financial Officer, explained in a 2001
interview:
[One] thing that separates [RTI] from ... other allograft companies
is that we work very closely.., with some recovery agencies around
the country.... [As a result, we] have more effective control over
our supply of the tissue because we are able to help drive and in-
crease the rate of donation in those territories. So we have got
probably a very, very solid source as far as supply goes, and the
ability to grow supply in the future. 8 3
RTI organized RTI Donor Services as a nonprofit entity. 184 This
was done, explained Wendy Crites Wacker, RTI's Manager of Corpo-
rate Communications, "because it is appropriate for a nonprofit entity
to approach families about donation [of a loved one's tissues], espe-
cially since families are being asked to donate for humanitarian rea-
sons.' 85 RTI Donor Services is also a charitable organization. 186 It
promotes health, a legally charitable purpose. 187 Its stated goal is
"[t]o provide human donated tissues for the benefit of others through
compassionate support, outreach and education to families and com-
munities. ' 188 Its primary beneficiaries-persons whose lives can be
saved or enhanced with allograft implants-constitute a charitable
181. E-mail from Paula Symons, Manager of Agency Communications, RTI Donor Services,
to Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis (July 15, 2005, 14:20 EDT) (on file with author); E-mail from
Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180 (referring to RTI Donor Services's "affiliation" with RTI).
182. BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY, supra note 56, at 368 (defining "subsidiary corporation" as
"[a] corporation in which a parent corporation has a controlling share.-Often shortened to
subsidiary"). Cf. id. at 63 (defining "affiliate" as "[a] corporation that is related to another cor-
poration by shareholdings or other means of control; a subsidiary, parent, or sibling
corporation").
183. Interview with Richard Allen, CFO of Regeneration Technologies, Feb. 19, 2001, http://
www.twst.com/notes/articles/lat60l.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
184. E-mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180 ("RTI Donor Services is a non-profit
organization . . . . The organization's earnings do not benefit private shareholders or
individuals.").
185. Mark Flatten, LegiVlators May Tighten Rules on Tissue Banking, E. VALLEY TRIB.. July
14, 2004 (quoting Wacker), http://www.eastvalleytribune.comlindex.php?sty=24740. See also E-
mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180 ("[T]hese types of services [that RTI Donor
Services provides] have been provided by not-for-profit organizations. For the community ser-
vices RTI Donor Services provides, we feel it is appropriate to be a non-profit company.").
186. E-mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180 (RTI Donor Services is "dedicated to
charitable, scientific and educational purposes"). As explained below, not all nonprofit organi-
zations are charitable. See infra notes 272-286 and accompanying text.
187. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
188. RTI 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 179 (quoting mission statement).
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class.1 89 RTI and RTI Donor Services claim that their arrangement
advances the latter's charitable mission. By transferring donated tis-
sue to RTI, "we [RTI Donor Services] can benefit from [RTI's] sci-
ence, safety and innovation to ensure the gifts that are entrusted to us
are maximized and sterilized through [RTI's] patented.. . tissue steril-
ization process, so that more people can receive safe, high quality al-
lograft implants for healthier lives."1 90
Although RTI Donor Services is a charitable nonprofit organiza-
tion, it is a taxable and tax-paying enterprise. 191 Even so, said Ms.
Wacker, the organization's "mission and level of service is [sic] the
same as that of a 501(c)(3) organization."' 192 RTI Donor Services did
not pursue tax-exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), said Ms. Wacker,
"because of its affiliation with Regeneration Technologies Inc. (RTI),
a for-profit public company. ' 193 Both organizations' websites promi-
nently state that RTI Donor Services is a nonprofit organization, but
fail to mention that it is not tax-exempt. 94
IV. WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF DONATED TISSUE, AND
WHO CAPTURES IT?
1 9 5
The National Organ Transplant Act contains provisions whose
meanings are uncertain and potentially puzzling. This Part uses eco-
nomic analysis to explain these provisions and explore the Act's
blueprint for the tissue industry. Section 301(a) may prohibit the
transfer of tissue for "valuable consideration,"'1 96 but it does not-in-
deed cannot-abolish the tissue's economic value. 197 By prohibiting
189. See infra notes 280-282 and accompanying text.
190. Announces RTI Donor Services, supra note 175. See also E-mail from Wendy Crites
Wacker, supra note 180 ("RTI Donor Services benefits from its affiliation with a for-profit com-
pany. The science and innovation provided by companies such as RTI benefit donor families
and recipients alike, and serve to maximize the gift to help as many people as possible.") (em-
phasis added).
191. E-mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180. Not all charities qualify for tax-
exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994), and charities that do qualify for tax-exemption
can choose to forego it. See infra notes 287-290 and accompanying text. In Part IV, I consider
whether RTI Donor Services's arrangement with RTI precludes tax-exemption, regardless of
whether the tissue bank desires that status. See infra notes 382-413 and accompanying text.
192. E-mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180.
193. Id.
194. Regeneration Technologies, Inc., RTI Donor Services, http://www.rtix.com/donorser-
vices/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005); Regeneration Technologies Donor Services, About
Us, http://www.rtidonorservices.com/en/aboutus/default.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
195. I am very grateful for the assistance of several economists in developing the analysis in
this Part: Marc Bilodeau, Woods Bowman, Dan Cole, Peter Grossman, Janet Netz, Patrick
Rooney, Warren Schwartz, Richard Steinberg, and Mark Wilhelm.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
197. See infra notes 208-215 and accompanying text.
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the sale of donated tissue, NOTA effectively requires donors and in-
termediaries in the tissue industry to transfer or re-gift this value in-
tact to the next party in line, until it reaches allograft recipients.
Section 301(c)(2) of NOTA permits intermediaries to earn "reasona-
ble payments" for activities associated with transplantation, but does
not define this term. 198 Reasonable payments, this Part argues, enable
intermediaries to recoup their outlays and opportunity costs (earn
normal profits), 199 and so preserve the tissue's value for allograft
recipients.200
If the markets for donated tissue and allografts were perfectly com-
petitive, this Part argues, market forces would effectuate NOTA's
scheme as a matter of course.201 In practice, however, these markets
deviate from the ideal of perfect competition because, among other
reasons, some processors obtain more tissue than other processors,
use patented technology to produce unique allografts, and cultivate
more brand loyalty for their processed tissues.202 These imperfections
enable some intermediaries to effectively sell donated tissue by earn-
ing supernormal profits.
A. An Economic Analysis of NOTA's Key Provisions
Economic analysis provides criteria for defining what constitutes
reasonable payments under NOTA and demonstrates the economic
value of donated tissue.
1. What Payments Are "Reasonable"?
Although NOTA prohibits the sale of donated organs and tissue for
transplantation, it recognizes that transplantations will not occur un-
less intermediaries-OPOs, tissue banks, processors-are fairly com-
pensated for their expenses and efforts. To this end, the Act permits
intermediaries to earn reasonable payments for activities associated
with transplantation. 203 In economic terms, reasonable payments en-
able an intermediary to: (a) recoup what it actually spends on inputs
(e.g., labor, fuel, and rent); and (b) cover its opportunity costs, which
are the value the firm loses by not using its resources to produce other
198. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
199. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
200. Limiting tissue banks and processors to "reasonable payments" does not guarantee that
the recipients of donated tissue will receive its economic value. For convenience, I ignore the
possibility that other intermediaries such as tissue distributors and healthcare providers will cap-
ture this value.
201. See infra notes 216-222 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 223-268 and accompanying text.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
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outputs.2 0 4 To cover its opportunity costs, a firm must earn at least
normal profits, which are the returns it would have earned had it in-
vested in a comparably risky venture.20 5 They are the minimum prof-
its necessary to induce a firm to continue its current venture.20 6
When intermediaries earn normal profits, they are rewarded for ad-
ding value to the donated tissue, but are not paid for the value of the
tissue itself. In economic terms, payments are "unreasonable," or ex-
cessive, under NOTA if they enable a firm to earn supernormal prof-
its-more than what the firm needs to recoup its expenses and earn
normal profits. Business owners are happiest with their line of work
when earning supernormal returns, as these are "a return [on invest-
ments] which exceeds the minimum necessary to induce the [entity] to
remain within the industry .... -207
2. The Economic Value of Transplant Tissue
Although NOTA prohibits the transfer of tissue for valuable consid-
eration, 20 8 it cannot erase the donated tissue's intrinsic economic
value. This value arises from what recipients are willing and able to
pay for the raw tissue from which allografts are processed. This value
equals the difference between: (a) what recipients would be willing
and able to pay for allografts if donors had to be paid for raw tissue;
and (b) the expenses and opportunity costs that intermediaries incur
recovering, testing, storing, transporting, processing, distributing, and
implanting the allografts made from donated tissue.20 9 The transfer of
tissue from altruistic donors to allograft recipients who are willing and
able to pay donors creates social wealth-"the total dollar value of
benefit society receives from a transaction .... "210
204. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 21 (1996)
(defining "opportunity cost").
205. Id. at 29. The Oxford Dictionary defines the term "required rate of return" as
[t]he minimum rate of return on an investment needed to make it acceptable to a busi-
ness. This may be higher than the rate at which the business can borrow: this is partly
to take account of the risks involved in investment, and partly because of the fear in an
imperfect capital market that extra borrowing now may increase the cost or difficulty of
borrowing in the future.
See also OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e2668 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
206. MACMILLIAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 310 (4th ed. 1992) (defining "normal
profits" as the "minimum amount of profit which a firm must acquire in order to induce the firm
to remain in operation" within the industry it currently occupies).
207. Id. at 415 (defining "super-normal profits") (emphasis added).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
209. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 204, at 40.
210. Id.
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To deliver the tissue's value to allograft recipients, it is essential to
limit payments to intermediaries to reasonable payments. When in-
termediaries earn no more than normal profits, they are rewarded for
adding value to donated tissue, but are not paid for the tissue itself. If
every intermediary earns no more than normal profits, the tissue's ec-
onomic value is preserved intact for allograft recipients. This value is
reflected in what recipients do not have to pay (the sums they save)
because raw tissue is gifted rather than sold.211 Conversely, when in-
termediaries earn supernormal profits, they are paid for more than
their expenses and opportunity costs: they are paid something for the
tissue itself. In this way, supernormal payments enable intermediaries
to capture the economic value of donated tissue.
To better grasp the economic value of donated tissue, consider a
hypothetical market for human heart valves for transplantation, as
represented by Figure 1.212 NOTA prohibits paying donors more than
zero dollars per valve (P'). At this "price," only 8,000 (Q') valves are
supplied each year. If donors were permitted to sell valves in a free
market, however, they would supply 12,000 valves (Q") a year at
$20,000 apiece (P,,). 2 13 On these assumptions, current donors of
valves collectively forego $160 million each year-the 8,000 valves
currently supplied for nothing multiplied by the $20,000 per valve that
the market is prepared to pay.214 This foregone wealth is represented
by shaded rectangle P'P"XQ'. 215
B. How the Economic Value of Donated Tissue Would Be
Distributed in a Perfectly Competitive Market
The concept of social wealth measures "the total dollar value of
benefit society receives from a transaction, regardless of how that ben-
211. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
212. This hypothetical tracks Pindyck and Rubinfeld's discussion of the market for human
kidneys. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 295-98 (5th ed.
2001).
213. Emanuel D. Thorne, When Private Parts Are Made Public Goods: The Economics of
Market-Inalienability, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 155 (1998). This assumes that altruistic persons
who donate 8,000 valves each year would continue to supply valves if offered $20,000 per valve.
Emanuel D. Thorne suggests that if cadaveric human tissue could be purchased and sold like
other commodities, some persons who would otherwise donate tissue might "refuse[ ] to treat
their loved ones' organs in this fashion," and thus "choose neither to donate nor to sell the
organs." Id. at 152.
214. In truth, the tissue industry expends resources to compensate suppliers through in-kind
transfers and steps deigned to increase the psychic satisfaction that suppliers derive from the
donating tissues. See supra notes 108-110 and infra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
215. For additional discussion of this graph and the derivation of its demand and supply
curves, see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 212, at 296-97.
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efit is distributed.2 16 This section explains how under certain, ideal
conditions, this benefit would be distributed to allograft recipients.
Allograft recipients are the source of donated tissue's economic
value by virtue of their willingness and ability to pay for allografts.
This does not mean, however, that allograft recipients capture the
donated tissue's value. Here then is the $160 million question: How
should the economic value of donated tissue be distributed? Under
NOTA's scheme, recipients should capture this wealth. The altruistic
donors of the tissue presumably want this result: just as they "sell"
tissue for nothing, they likely want recipients to "buy" tissue at the
same price. Yet how likely is this to happen? Many parties stand be-
tween donors and allograft recipients-tissue banks, processors, and
other intermediaries-and each may try to capture some of the tis-
sue's value. If the markets for donated tissue and allografts were per-
fectly competitive, however, allograft recipients would capture this
entire value.
As Professors Dan Cole and Peter Grossman explained, a perfectly
competitive market has the following characteristics:
(1) [M]any buyers and sellers, all of whom have complete informa-
tion about product qualities, quantities, and prices;
(2) no buyer or seller has sufficient market power to control the
price;
(3) market participants respond rationally to changing market
conditions;
216. SEIDENFELD, supra note 204, at 40 (emphasis added).
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(4) firms may enter and exit the market costlessly; and
(5) all resources or amenities within the economy are owned and
priced within the market . . . [as] determined by supply and
demand. 217
Perfectly competitive markets benefit society, and these benefits are
reflected in the size of the consumer's surplus. This term refers to
"the effective increase in wealth a consumer realizes" from acquiring
a good.218 In any given transaction, this surplus equals "the excess
value a consumer places on a good over the price of the good ....
For example, "[i]f a consumer would pay up to $10 for a good when
the market price is $7, then the consumer is said to have a 'utility'
surplus of $3 in purchasing the good. '220 In a perfectly competitive
market for a certain good, consumers capture all the social wealth cre-
ated by the good's transfer from producers to them.221 The good's
producers, by contrast, can earn no more than their economic costs-
the expenses and opportunity costs (normal profits). In such a mar-
ket, every producer incurs the same economic costs to make a certain
good, and no producer can sell that good for more than its economic
costs without losing all its customers. Conversely, a producer cannot
charge less than its economic costs (which corresponds to the good's
equilibrium price) without earning subnormal profits and ultimately
leaving the market altogether.222
The foregoing analysis yields a surprising conclusion: if the markets
for donated tissue and allografts were sufficiently competitive, market
forces would effectuate NOTA's scheme as a matter of course, thus
obviating the need for NOTA and its enforcement. Under these ideal
conditions, tissue banks, processors, and other intermediaries could
earn no more than their actual outlays plus normal profits-what the
Act calls reasonable payments. As a result, allograft recipients would
capture all the social wealth (economic value) created by the gratui-
tous transfer of tissue from altruistic donors to themselves. In the
heart valve hypothetical above, allograft recipients would capture the
entire $160 million in wealth that the donors of 8,000 valves collec-
217. DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 13
(2005). Perfectly competitive markets also create no externalities on third parties and have zero
transaction costs. Id.
218. SEIDENFELD, supra note 204, at 16 (defining "consumer surplus").
219. Id.
220. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, http://www.oxfor-
dreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T104.e350 (last visited Sept. 7, 2005)
(defining "consumer surplus").
221. SEIDENFELD, supra note 204, at 41.
222. Id. at 38.
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tively forego, with each recipient receiving an average of $20,000 in
value.
C. Intermediaries Can Capture the Economic Value of Donated
Tissue by Exploiting Market Imperfections
The markets for donated tissue and allografts are imperfectly com-
petitive in several ways: the demand for certain types of tissues out-
strips supply;223 some processors have greater access to donated tissue
than others;224 some use patented technology to produce unique al-
lografts;225 and some have greater name recognition and brand loyalty
for their allografts. 226 These conditions create opportunities for in-
termediaries to earn supernormal profits, and thereby capture some of
tissue's economic value intended for allograft recipients.
1. Exploiting NOTA-Created Shortages to Earn Supernormal Profit
Demand outstrips supply for certain types of tissue.227 There is, for
example, a national shortage of patellar tendon allografts, which are
used to reconstruct a knee joint ligament called the anterior cruciate
ligament (ACL).228 This shortage is attributed to a variety of factors
including: (a) the growing demand for this tissue, which is many physi-
cians' "first choice for ACL reconstruction grafts"; 229 (b) "a low sup-
ply of suitably qualified cadavers," as "there just aren't a lot of young,
healthy cadaver donors with low-risk life styles"; 230 and (c) the fact
that patellar tendon allografts are "difficult to dissect and there is a
high error rate for recovery. '231
The shortages of certain tissues are ultimately created by NOTA
itself, and would likely diminish if donors could lawfully sell tissue. In
223. See infra notes 227-248 and accompanying text.
224. See infra notes 404-409 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 249-260 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 261-268 and accompanying text.
227. Telephone Interview with Kevin Cmunt, Executive Vice President, AlloSource (Aug. 29,
2005) (explaining that there are shortages of patellar tendon, cancellous chips, traditional rings,
and bone wedges).
228. "The patellar tendon is a structure that attaches the quadriceps muscle group to the tibia
(shin bone)." The Athletic Advisor, Patellar Tendinits, http://www.athleticadvisor.com/Injuries
LE/Knee/patellartendinitis.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
229. F. Lincoln Avery, Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) Graft Options, http://www.orthoas-
sociates.com/ACL-grafts.htm#Allograft (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
230. Id. See also E-mail from Sam Davis, Director of Professional Services & Public Affairs,
IOPO, to Robert Katz. Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana Univer-
sity School of Law-Indianapolis (Sept. 22, 2005, 17:36 EST) (on file with author) ("[E]ven
when [a patellar tendon is] recovered with precision, a closer investigation of the tissue itself
may reveal natural tearing or other things that weaken its integrity.").
231. E-mail from Sam Davis, supra note 230.
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a perfectly competitive market for a certain good (cadaveric tissue),
the relevant resources "are owned and priced within the market. '232
Transplant tissues are not owned in this sense, and prices are set by
the Act-at zero-instead of the market. Competition for raw tissue
is thus inherently imperfect. The ban on tissue sales makes it harder
to summon more supply to meet increased demand. The resulting
shortages enable intermediaries that handle scarce tissue to extract a
premium from recipients. This premium is also known as an "eco-
nomic rent"-a payment to a resource or a factor of production "in
excess of what is necessary [as an incentive] to keep it to its present
employment. '233 These premiums consume at least some of the con-
sumer's surplus that allograft recipients would otherwise enjoy.
Consider how the tissue industry would operate if NOTA were
abolished, as depicted in Figure 2. The upward-sloping supply curve
(S) signifies that as the price of tissue increases, intermediaries will
pay next of kin more for their decedents' tissues. Its downward-slop-
ing demand curve (D) signifies that as the price of tissue increases,
consumers will demand fewer allografts. When this market is in equi-
librium (E), the quantity of tissue supplied equals the quantity de-
manded (Q) at the prevailing price (P).234
A change in demand alters the market's equilibrium, as illustrated
by Figure 3. If the demand for tissue increases (D to D'), the quantity
of tissue demanded at price P initially exceeds what will be supplied at
that price. Unless the supply can be increased, there will be shortages.
In the short run, one of two things will happen: (a) tissue will be allo-
cated among consumers by some nonprice method, such as rationing
or queuing;235 or (b) the price of tissue will rise (P to P"), thereby
reducing the number of consumers willing to purchase tissue at the
higher price (P"). A price increase yields a new equilibrium (E').
When tissue is sold for P", intermediaries can earn supernormal prof-
232. COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 217, at 13.
233. MACMILLIAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 206, at 121 (defining
"economic rent").
234. P is known as the equilibrium price. See OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=
T19.e1021, (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defining "equilibrium price" as the "price at which the
quantity of a good supplied is equal to the quantity demanded").
235. The Dictionary of Economics defines "shortage" as follows:
If there is a sudden rise in the demand or fall in the supply of a good, law or social
convention may prevent the price from rising far enough to clear the market, thus cre-
ating a shortage. When this occurs, available supplies of the good must be allocated by
some non-price method, such as formal or informal rationing, or queueing.
OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordreference.com/
views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e2850 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006).
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If tissue was a saleable commodity, the tissue market could readily
adjust to an increase in demand (D to D'). As depicted in Figure 4,
when the price of tissue goes up (P to P"), intermediaries will expand
supply by paying next of kin more for their decedents' tissues (S to S')
in order to capture the supernormal profits (economic rents) repre-
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sented by the shaded rectangle PP"E'E. As next of kin supply more
tissue (Q to Q'), the market price will fall (P" back to P). As this
happens, the rent available for intermediaries and next of kin to cap-
ture will shrink until a new equilibrium is achieved (E"). At this
point, intermediaries can once again earn no more than normal
profits.
FIGURE 4
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Because NOTA bars the tissue industry from paying next of kin for
tissue, it must use moral exhortation and other nonpecuniary means to
induce the public to supply more. 236 Yet these nonpecuniary means
are not costless: social resources must be spent on activities such as
public service announcements and education programs for schools
and workplaces. Moreover, these means may be marginally less per-
suasive than cash in inducing the public to supply more tissue. Any
reward that donor families receive for donating tissues must take the
form of in-kind services (e.g., counseling, memorial services), token
gifts (e, teddy bears), and altruistic satisfaction. 237 Yet the marginal
utility that donor families derive from each additional unit of intangi-
ble and in-kind rewards may diminish at a faster rate than each addi-
tional dollar. After a while, there is only so much consolation to be
derived from one more recognition ceremony, medal, or teddy bear.
236. Thorne, supra note 213, at 157-60.
237. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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There are thus inefficiency costs associated with using nonpecuniary
means to make adjustments that a free (and NOTA-free) market in
raw tissue could readily handle. 238 As the demand for tissue expands,
NOTA will likely result in endemic shortages of some tissue types.
It may be easier for processors, tissue banks, and other in-
termediaries to circumvent NOTA by transacting with each other than
with donors and donor families. There are unmistakable qualitative
differences between exchanging tissue for cash, rather than for in-kind
or intangible benefits. If next of kin were paid in cash, such transac-
tions would be relatively easy to detect. Because donor families do
not bear the costs of tissue recovery, 239 any payments they receive
could not be cast as reasonable payments for their activities.240 By
contrast, intermediaries regularly transfer money amongst themselves,
as with the Standard Acquisition Charges that processors pay tissue
banks in exchange for raw tissue.241 In this context, only dollar
amounts distinguish reasonable payments (normal profits) from un-
reasonable payments (supernormal profits). For this reason, it can be
difficult to distinguish between payments that compensate an interme-
diary for the value it adds to tissue, as opposed to the tissue itself.
Do intermediaries in the tissue industry exploit tissue scarcity to
earn supernormal profits? Generally speaking, tissue banks do not
charge a premium for scarcity. Their fees typically reflect what it costs
them to procure, handle, inspect, and ship tissues, plus a five to ten
percent mark-up for overhead, capital improvements, and other
costs. 242 This is true of the Indiana Organ Procurement Organization
(IOPO), which recovers both organs and tissues for transplantation.
According to Sam Davis, IOPO's Director of Professional Services
and Public Affairs, "We work with tissue processors that offer a stan-
dard recovery reimbursement to us based on our costs. My organiza-
238. I thank Patrick Rooney for his assistance in articulating this point.
239. The IOPO provides an answer to a frequently asked question:
Q: "Will my family be charged for donation?"
A: "No. All costs related to the' donation will be covered by the organ, tissue, and eye
recovery agencies."
IOPO, FAQs, http://iopo.org/questionsgeneral.asp?PAGEVIEW=Q05 (last visited Feb. 20,
2006).
240. This was the Arkansas court's finding in Wilson v. Adkins, 941 S.W.2d 440 (Ark. Ct. App.
1997). See supra notes 60-63, 65 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
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tion does not charge more for a patellar tendon [than] it does for an
[A]chilles [tendon]. ' '243
Among tissue processors, for-profit businesses may be more likely
to exploit shortages than nonprofit entities. Kevin Cmunt, Executive
Vice-President of the nonprofit processor AlloSource, reported that
his firm charges $1,700 for a patellar tendon allograft, and that other
nonprofits charge as little as $1,000.244 He contrasted these prices
with those of the for-profit CryoLife, which he says charges approxi-
mately $3,000 per tendon.245 Cmunt believed that CryoLife charges
more "because they can get [it]. ''246 (CryoLife would undoubtedly at-
tribute these price differentials to higher quality and better service. 247)
AlloSource refrains from charging more, said Cmunt, in order to pro-
vide more value to its consumers-the healthcare providers who buy
its allografts and the patients who ultimately receive them.248
2. Raising Prices in Response to Patent-Based Monopolies249
If the allograft market were perfectly competitive, every processor
would use identical processes to produce identical products. 250 In
practice, some processors use patented technology to produce unique
allografts, thereby reducing competition in the allograft market and
enabling lucky patent holders to earn supernormal profits. This state
of affairs reveals a deep tension between the goals of NOTA and intel-
lectual property law.
Some tissue processors have special access to patented processes
and products that have unique qualities and few substitutes. Intellec-
243. E-mail from Sam Davis, Director of Professional Services & Public Affairs, IOPO, to
Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis (Sept. 9, 2005, 14:46 EST) (on file with author).
244. Telephone Interview with Kevin Cmunt, supra note 227.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. CryoLife's website states that:
CryoLife's strict donor screening and testing procedures and quality specifications yield
superior [bone tendon] allografts for transplant. We permit physicians to select tissue
on a number of size dimensions thereby ensuring a proper patient-graft match and
decreasing graft preparation time in the operating room. A CryoLife Technical Repre-
sentative can be present to assist with tissue thawing and dilution. Upon request, Cry-
oLife representatives will conduct a thawing and dilution "in-service" workshop for
physician and hospital staff-an offering unique to CryoLife.
CryoLife, Inc., Tissue Services, Orthopaedic Tissue, CryoGraft Tendon, http://www.cryolife.com/
products/orthotendonnew.htm (last visited, Jan. 10, 2006).
248. Telephone Interview with Kevin Cmunt, supra note 227.
249. I am very grateful to Kenneth Crews for his help in developing the analysis in this
section.
250. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 204, at 35.
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tual property law gives patent holders the exclusive right to exploit an
invention for a period of years. 251 In some instances, a processor's
patented technology has enabled it to dominate certain segments of
the allograft market for many years. This is true of LifeCell, which is
the only commercial processor of acellular skin for transplantation,
the demand for which has grown considerably.25 2 It was also true of
CryoLife, which was "the first company to commercially develop the
ultra-low temperature preservation of viable human heart valves for
transplant[,] '' 253 and which continues to be a dominant source of cry-
opreserved heart valves.2 54  CryoLife's website proudly announces
that "the company holds thirteen exclusive cryopreservation patents
"255
Our legal system grants temporary, patent-based monopolies in or-
der to encourage investment in socially useful innovations.256 To
some extent, an inventor's monopolistic earnings reimburse the eco-
nomic costs (expenses and opportunity costs) that he or she incurred
to develop the patented process or product,257 and also to finance re-
search and development that bore no fruit. Yet part of a patent
holder's revenues are purely monopolistic profits,258 and this is by de-
sign. A patent-based monopoly, like all monopolies, results in an inef-
ficient use of resources and so fails to maximize social welfare. Yet we
tolerate such localized inefficiencies in the short run because we be-
251. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (giving a patent holder rights against anyone who makes the pat-
ented invention without the holder's authority); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing that a patent
lasts for a term of twenty years from the date of filing the patent application).
252. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
253. CryoLife, Inc., About CryoLife, http://cryolife.com/corporate/historynew.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2006).
254. CryoLife, Inc., Cardiac Tissue, http://www.cryolife.com/products/cardiac-mainnew.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
255. CryoLife, About CryoLife, A Brief History, http://cryolife.com/corporate/historynew.
htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
256. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e2282 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (de-
fining "patent" as "[a] legal device to encourage and reward invention by giving exclusive rights
to inventors. . . .This right can be used either through their own business, or by charging a
licence fee to other users.").
257. COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 217, at 103.
258. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e2029 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (de-
fining "monopoly profit" as "[an excess of profits over the normal rate which a firm is able to
make by exploiting a monopoly position. If the market were open to competitive entry, such
profits would be competed away ....").
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lieve (hope?) that this will yield greater efficiency across all markets in
the long run.259
On some level, NOTA and the patent system are fundamentally in-
consistent. After a certain point, it becomes exceedingly difficult to
distinguish between: (a) the unlimited profits that patent law permits
patent holders to earn from their innovations; and (b) the supernor-
mal profits that NOTA prohibits intermediaries to earn from their
transplantation-related activities. Unwieldy distinctions such as this
arise in other contexts. For example, "People with special abilities
may receive some element of economic rent, but it is hard to distin-
guish this from a return on the time and effort that leading baritones
or barristers put into their specialized training. ' 260 Which rules
should prevail-NOTA or intellectual property law? One might ar-
gue that it is "reasonable" to let tissue processing innovators earn su-
pernormal profits for a period of time, but this redefinition makes
NOTA's reasonable payments restriction meaningless.
3. Brand Loyalty
A processor can earn supernormal profits if its customers are espe-
cially loyal. "Brand loyalty" refers to the tendency for consumers to
"buy brands they have used before, or seen widely advertised, in pref-
erence to unbranded products or unfamiliar names."'2 61 In the tissue
industry, for-profit tissue processors were the first to brand their prod-
ucts and cultivate brand loyalty through advertising, marketing, and
professionally trained sales representatives. 262 Osteotech pioneered
this strategy by marketing its demineralized bone matrix (DBM)
under the Grafton trademark. 263 Over time, doctors develop prefer-
ences for certain brands of processed tissues. According to Sam Davis
of IOPO, they "go with what they are familiar with and data they
believe to be most accurate. '264 For many years in Indiana, for exam-
259. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 13 (3d ed. 2000).
260. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e937 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defin-
ing "economic rent").
261. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e273 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defin-
ing "brand loyalty").
262. Anderson & Bottenfield, supra note 133, at 19.
263. See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
264. E-mail from Sam Davis, Director of Professional Services & Public Affairs, IOPO, to
Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis (Sept. 23, 2005, 13:09 EST) (on file with author).
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pie, most cardiovascular surgeons preferred CryoLife's heart valves
over other processors' valves. 265
Consumers loyal to a particular brand may be willing to pay more
for it, even if other companies' products are less expensive and of
comparable or superior quality.266 In such cases, a producer can ex-
ploit brand loyalty to earn supernormal profits by charging more for
products that are identical to its competitors, or by charging the same
price for products that are of lesser quality and less expensive to pro-
duce than its competitors. These dynamics may occur in the tissue
industry. CryoLife has sold heart valves for approximately $12,000, as
compared to LifeNet, which charges approximately $8,000.267 The
higher price for CryoLife's valves, said IOPO's Davis, "could be con-
sidered subjective and arbitrary. '268
V. CAN CHARITY LAW PREVENT FOR-PROFIT PROCESSORS FROM
EXPLOITING DONATED TISSUE AND NONPROFIT
TISSUE BANKS?
2 69
NOTA posits a scheme for distributing a charitable resource-the
economic value of donated tissue-to its donors' intended benefi-
ciaries. It prohibits any party from selling tissue; rather, each party
must re-gift the tissue's value intact to the next party in line until de-
livered to allograft recipients. NOTA also promotes health by author-
izing compensation for intermediaries-their expenses plus normal
profits-for adding therapeutic value to donated tissue. If this scheme
were followed, the presence of for-profit businesses in the tissue in-
dustry would not interfere with the Act's philanthropic goals. In prac-
tice, however, this scheme is not fully realized.
This Part uses the analytical tools of charity law to examine
NOTA's philanthropic goals for the tissue industry. This exercise
promises both intellectual and practical payoffs. Charity law provides
an alternative account of philanthropic aims, how to achieve them,
and how they can be thwarted. Insofar as NOTA and charity law share
goals, the latter seems like a promising enforcement ally.
After surveying the charity law most relevant to our analysis, this
Part applies that law to the tissue industry. It addresses two questions:
do industry actors and arrangements violate charity law, and can char-
265. E-mail from Sam Davis, supra note 230.
266. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
267. See e-mail from Sam Davis, supra note 264.
268. Id.
269. I am very grateful to John Colombo and Woods Bowman for their assistance in
developing the analysis in this Part.
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ity law help advance NOTA's philanthropic goals? The discussion is
organized around two charity law doctrines. The first is the ban on
private inurement, also known as the nondistribution constraint,
which protects nonprofit organizations from exploitation by insid-
ers.270 It invites us to scrutinize a for-profit processor like RTI that
controls a nonprofit tissue bank like RTI Donor Services. The second
doctrine, called the ban on private benefit, deals with the indirect pri-
vate benefits of charitable activity-including benefits conferred on
unrelated and noncharitable third parties. For example, when a non-
profit organization improves facilities at a public lake, it also advances
the private interests of people who own lake front property.2 71 The
private benefit doctrine draws attention to tissue banks that transfer
tissue to for-profit processors, as such transfers may enable the trans-
feree to capture the tissue's economic value for private gain.
A. A Primer on Charity Law
This section explains the differences between nonprofit, charitable,
and tax-exempt organizations, and surveys the rules that govern them.
It pays special attention to the rules that restrict the use of nonprofit
organizations and their assets for private gain.
1. Nonprofit, Charitable, and Tax-Exempt Organizations
There is substantial overlap among nonprofit, charitable, and tax-
exempt organizations and the rules that govern them, but these orga-
nizations are not coextensive. The broadest category consists of non-
profit organizations. Charities are a type of nonprofit entity, and
many charities are tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
A nonprofit entity is organized and operated for some purpose
other than earning profits for those who control it. It is prohibited
from distributing its profits to insiders-for example, founders, direc-
tors, managers, and contributors-except as reasonable compensation
for goods, services, or other resources rendered. 272 This is known as
the nondistribution constraint,273 and Professor Henry B. Hansmann
po sitcd It as the dfnn, ,hrrtPristi. of nonprofit entities. 274 A non-
profit's earnings, if any, must be used to advance its mission-typically
270. See infra notes 272-275, 315-327 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 347-349 and accompanying text.
272. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 228 (1996).
273. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 248-49 (2004); HANSMANN, supra note 272, at 228.
274. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
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by increasing the output of the services and goods it was formed to
provide.275
A charity or charitable organization is a nonprofit entity that is
formed for a purpose deemed "charitable" under the state law of
charitable trusts.2 76 Legally charitable purposes include the promo-
tion of health,27 7 the relief of poverty,2 78 and "other purposes that are
beneficial to the community. 2 79 Additionally, the organization's ben-
eficiaries must constitute a "charitable class. ' 280 This means that the
beneficiaries must comprise a sufficiently large number of people, or a
sufficiently indefinite class of persons, such that their consumption of
the organization's output advances a public interest. 281 Poor, sick, or
elderly persons can be a charitable class,282 as are disadvantaged arti-
275. HANSMANN, supra note 272, at 228.
276. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003); Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance:
What's Trust Law Got to Do With It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 642 (2005) ("The definition of
charity set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Trusts controls across the board, from inheri-
tance disputes to federal tax law.") (internal citation omitted). Unless otherwise indicated, I will
use the terms "nonprofit" and "nonprofit organization" to refer exclusively to "charitable" and
"charity," respectively. A nonprofit's purpose need not be charitable. Non-charitable nonprof-
its include mutual benefit organizations such as social clubs and trade associations, which "hold
themselves out as benefiting, representing and serving a group of individuals or entities." AM. B.
Assoc., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT, at xxviii (1987) [hereinafter
RMNCA]. This is true of "mutual benefit" organizations such as social clubs, trade associations,
and fraternal organizations. Id.
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(d) (2003).
278. Id. § 28(a).
279. Id. § 28(f).
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 375 (1959).
281. Id.; GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 365 (2d ed., rev. 1991). As Professor John Columbo explained, under the common law,
a trust is considered "charitable" only if the trust provides a benefit to the general
public, as opposed to specific private individuals. In other words, a charitable trust has
to have a broadly-defined set of beneficiaries. Hence, a trust to maintain a public
graveyard was considered charitable at common law, while a trust to maintain a partic-
ular individual's tomb was not because it served private, rather than public, interests.
John D. Colombo, Private Benefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Healthcare as an Exempt
Purpose, 34 J. HEALTH L., 505, 507-08 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
282. Ruth Rivera Huetter & Marvin Friedlander, Disaster Relief and Emergency Hardship
Programs, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL IN-
STRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 1999, at 219-21 (1998), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopick99.pdf. This article was written by IRS officials for inclusion in the IRS's series of
Continuing Professional Education (CPE) texts. The IRS states that "[tihese materials were de-
signed specifically for training purposes only. Under no circumstances should the contents be
used or cited as authority for setting or sustaining a technical position." IRS, Charities & Non-
Profits, EO Tax Law Training Articles, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=96441,00.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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sans in developing societies.283 A charity may be organized as a chari-
table trust 284 or a nonprofit corporation,2 85 but most are set up as
corporations.286
Most nonprofits seek tax exempt status.287 Charities typically qual-
ify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), which applies to enti-
ties "organized and operated exclusively" for "exempt" purposes. '' 288
Exempt purposes under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) substantially overlap with
the purposes that trust law deems charitable. 28 9 Like charitable trusts,
tax-exempt organizations must also benefit a charitable class.2 90
2. The Fiduciary Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries Under State Law
The trustees of a charitable trust and the directors of a nonprofit
corporation have certain duties under state law. Trustees and direc-
tors must place the organization's interests before their own or those
of a noncharitable third party (the duty of loyalty).2 91 They must also
manage their organization and its assets in an informed and responsi-
283. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202, 213 (1978).
284. The archetypal charitable trust is created when a donor (settlor) executes a written in-
strument that obligates another party (the trustee) to use donated property for a charitable pur-
pose. PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE To WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 77 (2d ed. 1994);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). A donor can also create a charitable trust or its
equivalent within a nonprofit corporation by making a restricted gift to the entity. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959) ("Where property is given to a charitable corpo-
ration and it is directed by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a particular one of its
purposes, it is under a duty, enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General, to devote the
property to that purpose.").
285. A nonprofit corporation formed for a charitable purpose is known as a charitable or
"public benefit" nonprofit corporation. See RMNCA, supra note 276, §§ 1.40(28), 2.02(a)(2)(i)
(discussing public benefit nonprofit corporations); see also MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT
ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 1:01 (2002), available at http://
www.westlaw.com (under the RMNCA, "all Section 501(c)(3) organizations (charitable nonprof-
its) must be public benefit corporations").
286. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 63 (1995). See also AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 200 gen. cmts. a (Proposed Draft No. 3, 2005) ("American advisors routinely recom-
mend the nonprofit corporate form" over the trust form).
287. MARILYN E. PHELAN & ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 2 (2003).
288. I.R.C. § 501tc)(,13 (1994). To qualify for tavx-vxmption under I.R.C. 501(ct-(3) a char-
ity must limit its lobbying activities and cannot participate in electoral politics. Id.
289. Exempt purposes under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) include "religious, charitable, scientific .... or
educational purposes ..... Id.
290. See supra notes 280-283 and accompanying text. For convenience, I use the terms "tax-
exempt" and "exempt organization" to refer exclusively to entities that are tax-exempt under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). A non-charitable nonprofit can seek tax-exemption under other subsections
of I.R.C. § 501(c). See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (1994) (exempting nonprofit business leagues,
chambers of commerce, and the like, from federal corporate income tax).
291. See infra notes 294-299 and accompanying text.
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ble manner (the duty of care). 292 Although a director's duties are gen-
erally less demanding than a trustee's, 293 trust law sets normative
standards to which directors can aspire.
At its core, the duty of loyalty demands that fiduciaries comply with
the nondistribution constraint by not distributing the organization's
profits to themselves. 294 The duty obliges trustees to "administer the
trust ... solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose. ' 295 A trustee
can derive incidental benefits from a charity's activities, so long as his
or her decisions aim to advance the charity's best interests. 296 Addi-
tionally, a trustee must not subordinate the trust's interests to those of
a noncharitable third party.297 A director's duty of loyalty demands
that he or she act "in a manner the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation. '29  A director violates the
duty of loyalty by unjustly siphoning off corporate assets for the direc-
tor's private gain.29 9
The duty of care requires trustees to exercise reasonable effort and
diligence in administering a charitable trust.300 When selling trust
property, a trustee must "fully employ [his or her] care, skill and judg-
ment toward obtaining a fair market value for such property. ' 301 Sim-
ilarly, a director is obliged to manage a corporation's assets with a
degree of diligence, care, and skill.30 2 As a procedural matter, direc-
tors who wish to transfer corporate property must first "obtain all ma-
292. See infra notes 300-305 and accompanying text.
293. Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board
Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation's Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 689, 695-698 (2005); Daniel L. Kurtz, Safeguarding the Mission: The Duties and Liabilities
of Officers and Directors of Nonprofit Organizations (1992), available at http://www.westlaw.
com.
294. See supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text.
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.westlaw.com.
296. Id. § 78 cmt. d(1).
297. Id. § 78 cmt. f.
298. RMNCA, supra note 276, § 8.30(a)(3). See also Brody, supra note 276, at 653 (nonprofit
director's duty of loyalty arises from RMNCA § 8.30(a)(3)). Unlike a trustee, a nonprofit direc-
tor can generally transact with the corporation that he or she directs on terms that are fair to the
corporation. See RMNCA, supra note 276, § 8.31.
299. Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 638 (2005).
300. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005), available at http://
www.westlaw.com.
301. Interfirst Bank Dallas v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Tex. App. 1987) (citing Hatcher
v. United States Nat'l Bank, 643 P.2d 359 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)), disapproved on other grounds,
Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240, 249 (Tex. 2002).
302. See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1999). A direc-
tor's duty of care requires the director to act "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances .... ".RMNCA, supra note 276,
§ 8.30(a)(2).
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terial information reasonably available to [them] regarding" the
transfer.303 As a substantive matter, directors cannot give corporate
assets away30 4 or waste them, for example, by exchanging assets "for
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at
which any reasonable person might be willing to trade. '30 5
Trustees are obliged to advance the settlor's charitable purpose.30 6
Some commentators claim that nonprofit managers have an analogous
duty to affirmatively advance their corporation's mission.307 This so-
called "duty of obedience" 308 underscores the nonpecuniary mandate
of nonprofit corporations and their directors, as compared to their for-
profit counterparts. As Professor Harvey Goldschmid observed:
"For-profit directors and officers are principally concerned about
long-term profit maximization. While nonprofit directors and officers
keep economic matters in mind, they are principally concerned about
the effective performance of the nonprofits's [sic] mission. ' 30 9
As a general rule, a state attorney general has standing to bring suit
when directors breach their fiduciary duties.310 A state court can re-
move disloyal or reckless directors and order them to repay corporate
assets that were looted or wasted.311 In extreme cases, a state court
303. Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Revisiting the Duty of Care of the Nonprofit
Director, 36 J. HEALTH L. 183, 190 (2003).
304. 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 1102 (rev. vol. 2002); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
305. See FLETCHER, supra note 304, § 1102, at 131 & n.9. See also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d
180, 189 (Del. 1988) (finding that a director who wastes corporate assets violates a duty of care
where "what the corporation has received [for the asset] is so inadequate in value that no person
of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the corporation has
paid"). When a nonprofit corporation merges with a for-profit business, directors generally must
obtain the corporation's fair market value as if it were "operated as a business concern .
RMNCA, supra note 276, § 11.02(a)(4).
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE §379 cmt. a (1990) (ex-
plaining the trustee is obliged "to administer [the trust] solely in the interest of effectuating the
charitable purposes").
307. Katz, supra note 293, at 699-700.
308. Id.
309. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Para-
doxes, Probln.s, and Proposed Reforms, 23 i. CoRP. L. 631, 641 (1998) (internal citation
omitted).
310. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 286, at 254-57.
311. See, e.g., RMNCA, supra note 276, § 8.33(a). This section provides:
Unless a director complies with the applicable standards of conduct..., a director who
votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation of this Act is personally liable to
the corporation for the amount of the distribution that exceeds what could have been
distributed without violating this Act.
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can dissolve the corporation.312 The unrestricted assets of a dissolved
corporation are distributed as set forth in its organic documents, or
are transferred to other entities engaged in the same or similar
activities. 313
3. The Bans on Private Inurement and Private Benefit Under Tax-
Exempt Law
Charitable organizations and assets are sometimes used in ways that
benefit the private interests of persons other than the assets' intended
beneficiaries. For example, when a charity hires a for-profit fundrais-
ing firm to solicit donations on its behalf, this arrangement benefits
the for-profit firm's owners. 314 The federal law of tax-exempt organi-
zations (tax-exempt law) contains two doctrines designed to restrict
the use of an exempt organization (EO) and its assets for private gain.
a. The Ban on Private Inurement
Tax-exempt law prohibits an EO from distributing its earnings and
other economic assets to organizational insiders-founders, directors,
officers, and key employees 315-for their private gain.316 This prohi-
bition, known as the ban on private inurement, enacts the nondistribu-
tion constraint into tax-exempt law317 and complements an EO
director's duty of loyalty.318 According to the IRS, private inurement
is likely to arise when an EO transfers "financial resources to an indi-
vidual solely by virtue of the individual's relationship with the organi-
zation, and without regard to accomplishing exempt purposes. ' 319
312. See, e.g., id. § 14.30(a)(1)(iii) (the appropriate state court "may dissolve a corporation...
in a proceeding by the attorney general if it is established that ... the corporation is a public
benefit corporation and the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted").
313. See PHELAN, supra note 285, § 4:10. A charitable corporation's articles of incorporation
must state that on dissolution its assets will be distributed to another charitable undertaking.
RMNCA, supra note 276, §§ 2.02(a)(6), 14.06(a)(6).
314. See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
315. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 488 (8th ed. 2003) (not-
ing an EO's insiders include its founders, directors, officers, key employees, relatives, and certain
entities controlled by these persons).
316. See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
that a ban on private inurement was designed "to prevent the siphoning of charitable receipts to
insiders of the charity").
317. See, e.g., Valerie N. Hosfeld, Comment: Integrated Delivery Systems-The "Promised
Land" of Health Care: Obtaining a Federal Income Tax Exemption as a Nonprofit Organization
Under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 203, 212 nn.62-63
(1994) (explaining that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)'s ban on private inurement is a "nondistribution
constraint").
318. See supra notes 294-299 and accompanying text.
319. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 (July 31, 1980), available at 1980 IRS GCM LEXIS 71, at
*18-19.
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Classic private inurement occurs when an EO pays more, or receives
less, than fair market value (FMV) for an economic resource as a re-
sult of an insider transaction not negotiated at arm's length.320 Exam-
ples include selling corporate assets to insiders for inadequate
consideration, charging insiders below-market rent to lease corporate
property, and paying excessive salaries to directors and officers. 321
The ban on private inurement originates in the text of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), which provides that "no part of [an EO's] net earnings
[may] ... inure[ ] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual .... ,322 As used in this context, "net earnings" refers to an EO's
accounting profits and other economically valuable resources, 323 and
"private shareholder or individual" refers to an EO's insiders. 324 The
IRS can revoke the tax exemption of an entity whose resources have
been siphoned off by insiders.325 The IRS can also impose "interme-
diate sanctions" on insiders who derive excess benefits from their
transactions with the E0 326 and on managers who knowingly permit
such transactions to occur.327
b. The Ban on Private Benefit
A charitable activity can generate both public and private benefits.
The ban on private benefit restricts an EO's ability to engage in activi-
ties that benefit persons other than its intended charitable benefi-
320. Colombo, supra note 281, at 507; see also Anclote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (1998) (noting that "[flair market value has been defined as the price at
which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts")
(internal citation omitted).
321. See John D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemp-
tion for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIz. L. REV. 841, 850 (1993); see also Anclote
Psychiatric Center, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (1998) (finding that sale of tax-exempt nonprofit hospi-
tal for less than FMV to a for-profit corporation resulted in private inurement to the purchaser's
private owners, who were also directors of the tax-exempt nonprofit hospital); HoPKINS, supra
note 315, at 494-501 (observing that private inurement occurs when an EO pays an employee
excessive or unreasonable compensation).
322. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
323. HOPKINS, supra note 315, at 487-88 & nn.36-39.
324. Id. at 488.
325. See. e.g.. Anclote Psychiatric Center. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 175 (affirming the IRS's revoca-
tio*n of hospital's tax-exempt status where the sale of a hospital to insiders at a bargain price
resulted in private inurement).
326. See generally I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1) (1996). Intermediate sanctions can result from an ."ex-
cess benefit transaction" in which "the value of the economic benefit provided [to an insider]
exceeds the value of the consideration . . . received for providing such benefit." Id.
§ 4958(c)(1)(A). Under the intermediate sanctions regime, an insider (a "disqualified person")
is someone who, at any point during the five years preceding the excess benefit transaction, was
"in a position to exercise substantial influence over the [EO's] affairs . I..." Id. § 4958(f)(1)(A).
327. See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).
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ciaries.328 This "other than" class includes both EO insiders329 and
people who are not insiders-also known as organizational outsiders
or disinterested parties.330 The ban on private benefit focuses on the
secondary private benefits of an EO's otherwise charitable activities;
the ban demands that EOs refrain from such activities that excessively
or unduly benefit private interests. 331 As Professor John Colombo ex-
plained, the private benefit ban is very different from the trust law
principle that a charitable trust must benefit a charitable class, such as
poor or infirm persons.332 The state law principle "focus[es] on the
breadth of the charitable class directly served by the organization
rather than the benefits flowing to private interests as a result of serv-
ing the charitable class."333
The ban on private benefit is an administrative and judicial gloss on
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), which does not refer to the ban. Some authorities
claim that it inheres in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)'s requirement that an EO be
operated exclusively for exempt purposes. 334 Treasury regulations
elaborate this requirement by prohibiting EOs from applying more
than a small portion of their energies to benefiting private interests-
the ultimate nonexempt purpose. 335 The IRS can deny or revoke tax-
exemption to an entity that confers private benefit.336
Compared to private inurement, private benefit is a relatively re-
cent development in tax-exempt law. According to John Colombo,
328. Andrew Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under LR.C. 501(c)(3), in INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT FOR FISCAL 2001, at 135, 139 (2000),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich0l.pdf ("Private benefit ... can involve benefits to any-
one other than the intended recipients of the benefits conferred by the organization's exempt
activities.").
329. Private inurement is a subset of private benefit. Id. at 135.
330. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989) (noting that private benefit
can refer to an EO's "conferral of benefits on disinterested persons," where the term "disinter-
ested" is used to distinguish persons who are not EO insiders).
331. See infra notes 341-378 and accompanying text.
332. See Colombo, supra note 281, at 511.
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47, 74 (1999).
335. The American Campaign Academy court, for example, noted:
[S]hould the petitioner [an organization seeking tax-exempt status] be shown to benefit
private interests, it will be deemed to further a nonexempt purpose under section
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. This nonexempt purpose will prevent peti-
tioner from operating primarily for exempt purposes absent a showing that no more
than an insubstantial part of its activities further the private interests or any other non-
exempt purposes.
American Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. at 1066.
336. The intermediate sanctions regime does not apply to private benefit transactions. See
Mychel Russell-Ward, Joint Ventures Beware: Discrepancies Exist in Penalties for Inurement and
Private Benefit Scenarios, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 95, 95-96 (2004), available at http://www.
lexisnexis.com.
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the unofficial historian of the present-day private benefit doctrine,337
the IRS conceived the doctrine in the late 1970s,338 and the United
States Tax Court adopted it in 1989 in American Campaign Academy
v. Commissioner.339 The concept gained further legitimacy when
Judge Richard Posner discussed it favorably in United Cancer Council,
Inc. v. Commissioner,340 a Seventh Circuit decision issued in 1999.
This section surveys how the IRS, the tax court, and Judge Posner
have each formulated the doctrine.
i. IRS: Private benefits impermissible if avoidable or substantial,
relative to an activity's public benefits
Under the IRS's standard an EO can engage in a charitable activity
that benefits outsiders, so long as these private benefits are relatively
insubstantial and unavoidable. An activity's private benefits are per-
missible if they are both: (a) insubstantial compared to their public
benefits (or "quantitatively incidental" to the public benefits); 341 and
(b) "a necessary concomitant '342 or "mere byproduct" 343 of the activ-
ity, such that its public benefits "can be accomplished only by benefit-
ing certain private individuals '344 (i.e., the private benefits are
"qualitatively incidental" to the activity). 345 A charitable activity is
337. Today's private benefit doctrine differs from earlier formulations advanced by the IRS
but which never took hold. See Colombo, supra note 281, at 508-09.
338. Id. at 508 (internal citations omitted).
339. Id. at 510 (citing 92 T.C. 1053).
340. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).
341. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987), available at 1987 IRS GCM LEXIS 2, at
*15-16. There is controversy over the IRS's methodology for assessing whether a charitable
activity's private benefits are substantial relative to its public benefits. According to the IRS, the
key inquiry is whether a particular activity's private benefits are substantial compared to its
public benefits-even if these private benefits are insubstantial compared to the public benefit
generated by all the organization's activities. Id.; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21,
1991), available at 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39, at *34. Professor Colombo has criticized this
methodology as "indefensible as a legal and policy matter." Colombo, supra note 281, at 524
(interna! citations omitted). in American Campaign Academy, the tax court seemed to look at
the totality of an EO's activities. See infra notes 361, 366-367 and accompanying text.
342. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, supra note 341, at *15-16.
343. Megosh et al., supra note 328, at 137.
344. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 supra note 341, at *15-16.
345. Id. at *16. Cf I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 19, 1988), available at 1988 IRS
GCM LEXIS 44, at *12-13 (rejecting the argument that joint venture with for-profit entities
confers nonincidental private benefit unless the exempt entity can show that this arrangement
was the only way to pursue its charitable purpose).
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impermissible if its private benefits are either quantitatively or qualita-
tively nonincidental to its public benefits.346
Qualitatively incidental benefits are illustrated by Revenue Ruling
70-186. 3 47 This ruling involved an organization that maintained and
improved recreational facilities at a public lake.348 Its activity obvi-
ously advances the private interests of people who own lake front
property. At the same time, "it would be impossible for the organiza-
tion to accomplish its purposes without providing [private] benefits"
to these owners. 349
The IRS's approach focuses on the actual benefits generated by an
activity-the benefits themselves, and their relative magnitude and
avoidability. It matters less whether the EO engaging in the activity
intended to generate these private benefits.350 This view finds support
in Revenue Ruling 76-206, which involved a nonprofit organization
that promoted classical music programs broadcast by a for-profit radio
station. 351 According to IRS officials, "[T]he motivation of the organ-
ization's creators was purely a desire to continue the broadcasting of
classical music in their community" 352-an educational and hence tax-
exempt purpose.353 The IRS nevertheless denied tax-exempt status
on grounds that the organization's activity disproportionately bene-
fited the for-profit station relative to the public benefits. 354 These ac-
tivities included efforts to enlarge the station's audience, sell the
346. This is implicit in the IRS's assertion that "[a]ny private benefit arising from a particular
activity must be 'incidental' in both a qualitative and quantitative sense to the overall public
benefit achieved by the activity .... " IRS GCM 39,862, supra note 341, at *34.
347. Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129. See Megosh et al., supra note 328, at 137 (discussing
Rev. Rul. 70-186 to illustrate the concept of qualitatively incidental private benefits).
348. Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129.
349. Id.
350. But see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 341, at *34 (observing that private
benefits that are "a necessary concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at large"-and
thus qualitatively nonincidental-"might also be characterized as indirect or unintentional").
351. Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154.
352. Megosh et al., supra note 328, at 138.
353. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-175, 1964-1 C.B. 185 (finding that a nonprofit corporation formed
"to stimulate, promote and develop interest in the dramatic arts, to educate the American public
in the dramatic arts, to advance the national culture in the field of dramatic arts, and to bring the
dramatic arts to areas and population centers that are not adequately served in this respect"
qualified for exemption as an educational organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). See Rev. Rul.
76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154 ("Rev. Rul. 64-175 supports the view that a nonprofit organization that
preserves and maintains classical music programming in a particular locale is serving an educa-
tional purpose.").
354. Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154 ("[O]rganization's activities benefit[ed] the for-profit
radio station in more than an incidental way.").
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station's program guide, recruit businesses to sponsor the station, and
encourage the public to patronize these sponsors.
355
Under the IRS's approach, even an FMV transaction between an
EO and a private party can confer prohibited private benefit. The
IRS established this in General Counsel Memorandum (GCM)
39862,356 which denied tax-exemption to a joint venture between a
nonprofit hospital and staff physicians in its surgery clinic. The hospi-
tal contracted to sell the clinic's net revenue stream to this joint ven-
ture. The IRS accepted the representation that the joint venture paid
FMV for this revenue stream,357 but this fact did not preclude exces-
sive private benefit. As IRS officials explained, "[U]nlike [private]
inurement, finding private benefit does not require that payments [by
the would-be exempt organization] for goods or services be unreason-
able or exceed fair market value. '358 In GCM 39862, the joint venture
was defective because the private benefits it generated for the physi-
cians were "substantial" compared the public benefits it generated.
359
ii. Tax court: Private benefits impermissible if intentional and a
substantial portion of an organization's activities
In American Campaign Academy, the tax court endorsed the con-
cept of prohibited private benefit, but not the IRS's conception of it.
The tax court's private benefit analysis focuses more on "the purpose
towards which an organization's activities are directed," rather than
"the nature of the activities themselves. '360 To determine whether
private benefits are qualitatively nonincidental, the tax court asked
whether an EO intends to benefit a particular set of private interests,
rather than whether these private benefits are avoidable. To deter-
mine whether private benefits are quantitatively nonincidental, the tax
355. Id. These private benefits may have been unavoidable (qualitatively incidental) if the
for-profit radio station was the only outlet for classical music in the community-for example, if
there was no public radio station.
356. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 341.
357. Id. at *2 (accepting as fact the hospital's claim "that the purchase price for the revenue
stream was established at fair market value after arm's length negotiations, and was properly
discounted to present value"); id. at *7.
358. Megosh et al., supra note 328, at 138.
359. The IRS found that public benefits produced by the joint venture-greater utilization of
the clinic and more net income for the hospital-did not substantially advance the hospital's
charitable mission. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 341, at *35-36. The IRS also
held that the arrangement constituted private inurement. Id. at *27 ("Giving (or selling) medical
staff physicians a proprietary interest in the net profits of a hospital under these circumstances
creates a result that is indistinguishable from paying dividends on stock.").
360. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1078-79 (1989).
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court asked whether these benefits were substantial relative to all the
public good an organization accomplishes.361
In American Campaign Academy, the tax court reviewed the IRS's
refusal to grant tax exemption to the American Campaign Academy
(the Academy), a nonprofit entity that trained political campaign
workers. The Academy was a bona fide charity under state law: it
advanced a charitable purpose (education), and its primary benefi-
ciaries (students) constituted a charitable class.362 The problem, ac-
cording to the IRS, was that the Academy's activities excessively
benefited the Republican candidates and entities that employed most
of the Academy's students.363
The tax court upheld the IRS's refusal on two grounds. First, it
found that the Academy specifically intended to advance particular
private interests: the Academy "conducted its educational activities
with the partisan objective of benefiting Republican candidates and
entities" that hired its students.364 The purposefulness of these private
benefits makes them qualitatively nonincidental to the Academy's
otherwise charitable activity. 365 Second, the purposeful advancement
of Republican interests was a substantial part of the Academy's activ-
ity,366 and thus quantitatively nonincidental to that activity. The
Academy's primary purpose may have been to educate its students,
said the tax court, but it was also "formed with a substantial purpose"
to advance the private interests of these particular, noncharitable par-
ties. 367 Advancing Republican interests was part of the Academy's
raison d'itre.
361. Id. at 1066. See supra note 335. See also Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unan-
swered Questions From Redlands Surgical Services, 29 EXEMPr ORGS. TAX REV. 433, 444
(2000), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com ("[American Campaign Academy] supports the ...
conclusion that private benefit is only fatal if the private benefit is substantial when compared to
the public good an entity accomplishes.") (internal citation omitted).
362. See Colombo, supra note 281, at 510.
363. 92 T.C. at 1077 ("Petitioner has not established that the specific Republican entities and
candidates which benefited by its educational programs were members of a charitable class.").
Private inurement was absent because Republican candidates and entities did not control the
Academy. Id. at 1065 ("[The IRS] does not contend that [the Academy's] earnings inure to the
benefit of private shareholders or individuals ... .
364. Id. at 1070.
365. Id. at 1069.
366. Id. at 1075 (affirming the IRS's determination that "more than an insubstantial part of
[American Campaign Academy's] activities were performed to further a nonexempt purpose"-
namely, to benefit Republican entities and candidates).
367. Id. at 1078 ("[W]e find the administrative record supports [the IRS's] contention that
[American Campaign Academy] was formed with a substantial purpose to train campaign pro-
fessionals for service in Republican entities and campaigns .... ").
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Under the tax court's approach, charitable activity that generates
secondary private benefits is not prohibited unless the charity targets
these benefits towards a particular private party-unless they are
qualitatively nonincidental. This differs from the IRS's approach,
which prohibits charitable activity whose secondary private benefits
are either qualitatively or quantitatively nonincidental.
iii. Judge Posner: Non-FMV transactions can confer private benefit
Judge Posner opines that an EO's directors, if careless, can unilater-
ally confer private benefit on outsiders through non-FMV transactions
negotiated at arm's length. This conception of private benefit enacts
the nonprofit director's duty of care into tax-exempt law.
Judge Posner presented his views on private benefit in United Can-
cer Council.368 This case considered the IRS's decision to revoke tax-
exemption status for United Cancer Council, Inc., (UCC), a nonprofit
corporation formed to promote cancer prevention and to help cancer
victims. 369 In 1984, UCC contracted with Watson & Hughey Com-
pany (W&H), a for-profit fundraising firm, to solicit donations on
UCC's behalf. From 1984 to 1989, W&H's fundraising campaign
grossed $28.8 million, but netted only $2.3 million for UCC.370 The
IRS later revoked UCC's tax exemption (retroactive to 1984) on
grounds that its contract with W&H resulted in the private inurement
by W&H. 371 The IRS argued (as paraphrased by Judge Posner) that
"the contract was so advantageous to W&H and so disadvantageous
to UCC that the charity must be deemed to have surrendered the con-
trol of its operations and earnings to the noncharitable enterprise that
it had hired to raise money for it. '' 372 The tax court affirmed the IRS's
decision on the basis of private inurement by W&H as a UCC in-
sider.373 The IRS also claimed that UCC conferred private benefit on
W&H as an UCC outsider, but the tax court did not reach this
claim.374 Judge Posner rejected and reversed the tax court's judgment.
There could be no private inurement by W&H, Judge Posner held,
because W&H's managers were not UCC insiders, as evidenced by
the fact that the contract between the organization and the fundrais-
ing firm had been negotiated at arm's length.375 The case was re-
368. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).
369. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 326, 329 (1997).
370. 165 F.3d at 1175.
371. Id. at 1174-75.
372. Id. at 1175.
373. Id. at 1174-75.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1176, 1178.
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manded back to the tax court for a determination as to whether UCC
conferred prohibited private benefit on W&H.
In discussing the private benefit doctrine, Judge Posner connected it
to the nonprofit director's duty of care under state law. He opined
that careless directors could unilaterally confer private benefit on an
outsider:
[Tihe board of a charity has a duty of care.., and a violation of that
duty which involved the dissipation of the charity's assets might...
support a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit,
even if the contracting party did not control, or exercise undue in-
fluence over, the charity.376
More specifically, careless directors can enrich outsiders through non-
FMV transactions negotiated at arm's length. Judge Posner
continued:
Maybe the [UCCI board did not negotiate as favorable a contract
with W&H as the board of a profitmaking firm would have
done.... Then it could be argued that UCC was in fact being oper-
ated to a significant degree for the private benefit of W&H, though
not because it was the latter's creature. 377
In Judge Posner's discussion, private benefit superficially resembles
private inurement in that both can result from non-FMV transactions.
Yet the two phenomena differ in cause. Private inurement can occur
when disloyal directors enrich themselves through lopsided exchanges
with their organization. Private benefit can occur when careless direc-
tors enrich outsiders through lopsided exchanges with the latter.
Judge Posner suggested that the IRS could use the ban on private ben-
efit "to deal with the problem of improvident or extravagant expendi-
tures by a charitable organization" that benefit outsiders rather than
insiders. 378
B. Can Charity Law Prevent For-Profit Processors From Exploiting
Donated Tissue and Nonprofit Tissue Banks?
This section applies charity law to the tissue industry. It asks two
basic questions. Do any actors or arrangements in the tissue industry
violate charity law? If so, can charity law be used to advance NOTA's
philanthropic goals?
The exposition is organized around the bans on private inurement
and private benefit, respectively. The ban on private inurement,
which protects nonprofit organizations from exploitation by insiders,
376. 165 F.3d at 1180.
377. Id. at 1179.
378. Id.
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applies most forcefully to the for-profit processor (e.g., RTI) that con-
trols a nonprofit tissue bank (e.g., RTI Donor Services). This section
explains how a for-profit parent could exploit a captive tissue bank for
private gain, and how charity law can deter such exploitation.379 The
ban on private benefit draws attention to nonprofit tissue banks that
supply raw tissue with its economic value intact. Although these
transfers advance a tissue bank's mission, they arguably confer a non-
trivial, secondary benefit on the for-profit transferee-they give a
transferee an opportunity to capture the tissue's value for private
gain.380 The IRS's formulation of the ban, which focuses on whether
private benefits are unavoidable, might impel tissue banks to take
steps to prevent for-profit processors from exploiting the donated
tissue.381
1. Charity Law Deters For-Profit Processors From Using Captive
Tissue Banks for Private Gain
A for-profit processor can exploit a captive tissue bank to increase
its profits and become more competitive. The processor can pay less
than FMV (or subnormal profits) for its subsidiary's services, and
thereby appropriate that entity's foregone profits. Even if the proces-
sor pays FMV for these services, there are more subtle ways it can use
this arrangement to become more competitive. Several charity law
doctrines-the bans on private inurement and private benefit and the
duties of loyalty and care-can help deter such behavior.
a. For-Profit Processor Violates Ban on Private Inurement by
Appropriating a Captive Tissue Bank's Foregone Profits
The for-profit RTI controls the nonprofit RTI Donor Services, 382
which supplies the former with raw tissue in exchange for service
fees. 383 Like all nonprofit organizations, RTI Donor Services is not
immune from bankruptcy. To avoid insolvency, it must at least break
even in an accounting sense. For this reason, RTI Donor Services's
service fees must enable it to recoup expenses like tissue recovery and
donor family aftercare.
Tf RT Dnor Services was an independent entity, it would presum-
ably set its service fees high enough to recoup its expenses and earn atleast normal profits. This might entail, say, a six percent margin over
379. See infra notes 382-399 and accompanying text.
380. See infra notes 421-428 and accompanying text.
381. See infra notes 429-432 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 124, 175 and accompanying text.
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actual expenses. 384 There are many reasons why a nonprofit would
want to earn normal profits. (Recall that a nonprofit can earn profits,
so long as it applies them towards its mission.) 385 According to
IOPO's Sam Davis, a well-run nonprofit can "invest in technology,
infrastructure and people to advance the science and fulfill a mis-
sion. . . . Those that do [this] can have a lot of impact on their
industry." 386
A rational, nonprofit tissue bank might even seek supernormal
profits. Some tissue banks are operated by OPOs.387 An OPO gets
paid for its organ transplant services only when organs are actually
transplanted. 388 As a result, its organ-related revenues shrink when
organ donations are low. 389 Tissue banking, by contrast, provides a
more stable revenue stream. 390 An OPO can use profits from tissue
banking to subsidize its organ transplant operations. The IOPO, for
example, "use[s] the revenue from tissue banking to help control the
medical inflation associated with obtaining solid organs for
transplantation." 391
Because RTI controls RTI Donor Services, there are no arm's
length negotiations between the two entities. RTI presumably dic-
tates its subsidiary's service fees. According to Kevin Cmunt of the
nonprofit AlloSource, RTI obtains raw tissue from RTI Donor Ser-
vices for less than what it pays independent tissue banks.392 Why is
that? A for-profit processor might set its captive tissue bank's service
fees too low for it to earn normal profits (recoup its opportunity
costs). In this way, a for-profit parent siphons off a financial re-
source-the normal profits its subsidiary foregoes by underpricing its
services-in order to benefit the for-profit's owners and insiders. The
parent captures these foregone profits by charging consumers the
market price for allografts it produces from underpriced tissue. This
siphoning off violates the nondistribution constraint.
384. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
386. E-mail from Sam Davis, Director of Professional Services & Public Affairs, IOPO, to
Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis (Sept. 9, 2005, 13:53 EST) (on file with author).
387. The IOPO recovers both organs and tissues. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
388. E-mail from Sam Davis, Director of Professional Services & Public Affairs, IOPO, to
Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis (Sept. 9, 2005, 21:04 EST) (on file with author).
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Telephone Interview with Kevin Cmunt, supra note 227.
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If RTI Donor Services-a taxable nonprofit-violates the nondis-
tribution constraint in this way, we must look to state law for recourse.
Upon a motion by the attorney general, a state court could remove
any RTI insiders who sit on RTI Donor Services's board for breaching
their duty of loyalty, which demands that they put the nonprofit's in-
terests ahead of the for-profit's interests. 393 If any tissue bank direc-
tors are not RTI insiders, they could be removed for breaching the
duty of care, which enjoins giving away or wasting corporate assets.394
In specifying a nonprofit director's duty of loyalty, a state court might
be influenced by the more rigorous standards for charitable trustees.
In that case, a director who is not an RTI insider might also be found
to violate the duty of loyalty, which prohibits charitable fiduciaries
from subordinating a charity's interests to those of a noncharitable
third party.395 A court could also compel RTI Donor Services's direc-
tors who breached their fiduciary duties to reimburse the tissue bank
for the profits effectively diverted to RTI.396 If a substantial part of
RTI Donor Services's mission is to shift profits to RTI, a court might
dissolve the corporation and transfer its resources to a truly charitable
tissue bank.397
This analysis points to a prescription: federal law should require
nonprofit tissue banks to have tax-exempt status under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3). Because RTI Donor Services is not tax-exempt, the state
attorney general is the primary enforcer of the nondistribution con-
straint. This is troublesome because attorney general supervision of
nonprofit organizations is generally spotty.398 If a nonprofit organiza-
tion is also tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), however, the IRS can
supplement state authorities by enforcing the ban on private inure-
ment, federal tax law's counterpart to the nondistribution
constraint. 399
b. A For-Profit Processor May Derive More Subtle Private
Benefits From a Captive Tissue Bank
This section asks whether RTI Donor Services confers prohibited
private benefits on RTI and is thus ineligible for tax-exemption. Al-
though the ban on private benefit is typically applied to an exempt
393. See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 298-311 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
398. Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999
Wis. L. REV. 227, 250-51.
399. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
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organization's dealings with outsiders, it also applies to dealings with
insiders.400 The ban on private inurement prohibits the most blatant
ways that a nonprofit's insiders can exploit the organization.40 Tax-
exempt law's ban on private benefit, by contrast, targets the more sub-
tle ways that nonprofits can further private interests.
The above question is hypothetical because as a taxable, charitable
entity, RTI Donor Services is not bound by the ban on private benefit.
The question is worth asking, however, because the ban on private
benefit posits a norm for how charities ought to behave. If RTI Do-
nor Services violates that norm, this raises questions as to its charita-
ble bona fides. 40 2 Indeed, RTI Donor Services may have intentionally
declined tax-exemption in order to benefit RTI without risking cen-
sure from the IRS.40 3
RTI clearly finds it more advantageous to obtain tissue from a cap-
tive tissue bank rather than from tissue banks it does not control. If
this were not so, RTI would simply obtain tissue from autonomous
tissue banks, as other for-profit processors do. Critically, RTI can
benefit from its influence over its subsidiary even if it pays FMV for
its tissue banking services. RTI Donor Services provides its for-profit
parent with a robust and stable supply of raw tissue, and this gives
RTI a competitive edge over other processors. 40 4 By operating an in-
house tissue bank, RTI can reduce some of the transaction costs it
would incur obtaining tissue from separate entities it does not con-
trol.40 5 With more tissue to process, RTI can achieve economies of
scale.406 By obtaining and processing a whole gamut of tissues, it can
400. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
401. See Colombo, supra note 321, at 850 (most instances of private inurement "are not subtle
and involve a clear abuse of the economic benefits of exemption").
402. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
403. According to RTI spokesperson Wendy Crites Wacker, RTI Donor Services did not pur-
sue tax-exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) "because of its affiliation with Regeneration Tech-
nologies Inc. (RTI), a for-profit public company." See supra text accompanying note 193.
404. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
405. See OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfor-
dreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview-main&entry=T19.e3177 (last visited Jan. 8, 2006)
(defining "transaction cost economics" as "an approach to the economic explanation of institu-
tions. This considers the relative merits of conducting transactions within firms and between
different firms using markets. It takes account of bounded rationality, information problems,
the costs of negotiating contracts, and opportunism.").
406. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e942 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defin-
ing "economies of scale" as "[t]he factors which make it possible for larger organizations or
countries to produce goods or services more cheaply than smaller ones .... Specialized equip-
ment usually comes in units of some minimum size, so that a larger total output makes it eco-
nomic to use more specialized equipment.").
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achieve economies of scope.40 7 If it can cut its costs without cutting its
prices, RTI can increase its net earnings on each unit of processed
tissue it distributes.40 8 Some consumers (e.g., hospitals and doctors)
might prefer to deal with a processor with a solid supply of tissue, as it
is less likely to run out of particular products. These consumers may
be willing to pay a premium for this "in-stock" guarantee as insurance
against the risk of inadequate supply. 40 9 Lastly, some consumers may
prefer to deal with a processor that offers a wide range of products.
These consumers may be willing to pay a premium for the conve-
nience and cost savings of "one-stop shopping"-obtaining all their
processed tissues from a single source.
RTI Donor Services's activities benefit both the public and RTI's
owners and investors. There is nothing inherently objectionable about
this. To the contrary, a nonprofit tissue bank may be able to advance
its charitable goals more effectively by partnering with a for-profit
processor. According to Martha Anderson, an officer of the nonprofit
MTF, "[a] tissue bank's goal of maximizing the use of donated tissues
can be better realized through these relationships" with for-profit
businesses for processing, marketing, distribution, and R&D. 410 With-
out such partnerships, wrote Anderson and a colleague, "many non-
profit tissue banks would have found the high costs associated with
[these activities] to be prohibitive. ' 41 RTI echoes Anderson to justify
its arrangement with RTI Donor Services. According to RTI's
Wacker: "RTI Donor Services benefits from its affiliation with a for-
profit company. The science and innovation provided by companies
such as RTI benefit donor families and recipients alike, and serve to
maximize the gift to help as many people as possible. '412
This statement is true, but it does not resolve the private benefit
concerns. Why is RTI Donor Services affiliated with this particular
processor rather than with another, or with multiple processors, be
they for-profit or nonprofit? The answer is not difficult to fathom:
RTI created and controls RTI Donor Services in order to capture the
private benefits generated by the tissue bank's activities. For this rea-
407. OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordrefer-
ence.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T19.e943 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defin-
ing "economies of scope" as "[tihe benefits arising from carrying on related activities ...
Specialized labour, equipment, and ideas used in one activity are often also useful in related
activities.").
408. This assumes that RTI would not pass on its savings to its consumers.
409. I thank Woods Bowman for this observation.
410. Anderson & Schapiro, supra note 5, at 11-12.
411. Id. at 12.
412. E-mail from Wendy Crites Wacker, supra note 180 (emphasis added).
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son, this arrangement appears to meet the American Campaign Acad-
emy criteria for prohibited private benefit, namely that: (a) RTI
Donor Services conducts its otherwise charitable activities in a man-
ner calculated to confer nontrivial benefits on RTI; and (b) advancing
RTI's private interests is part of RTI Donor Services's raison d'itre.4A 3
The arrangement between RTI and its nonprofit subsidiary is not
only doctrinally suspect, it is genuinely troubling. RTI Donor Services
may indeed best serve its charitable purposes by supplying its tissue to
RTI. The problem is that RTI Donor Services's board of directors
probably did not decide-independently, on the merits, with full in-
formation, after considering the alternatives-that this was in fact the
best way to serve its charitable mission. More likely, RTI's directors
decided that it would be in RTI's best interests for RTI Donor Ser-
vices to supply it with tissue. As for RTI Donor Services's board, it
may be, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland: "There is no there
there." 414
This analysis also supports requiring nonprofit tissue banks to be
tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). If nonprofit tissue banks must
comply with the ban on private benefit, they are more likely to decide
on the merits how best to advance their organization's mission, and
are less likely to be manipulated by noncharitable insiders.
2. Tissue Banks May Confer Undue Private Benefit on Unrelated
Processors
RTI Donor Services is an outlier; most tissue banks are not con-
trolled by for-profit businesses. The ban on private inurement is thus
a limited tool for regulating the tissue industry, as it applies only to
relationships between nonprofits organizations and their controllers.
This section explores two charity law doctrines that govern arm's
length relationships between nonprofit tissue banks and unrelated for-
profit processors-the duty of care and the ban on private benefit. Of
these, only the duty of care can be used to advance NOTA's philan-
thropic goals and effect compliance with its commands.
413. See supra notes 366-367 and accompanying text.
414. The Columbia World of Quotations, http://www.bartleby.com/66/37/55537.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2006).
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a. A Tissue Bank's Directors May Violate Duty of Care by Selling
Their Organization's Services to Unrelated Processors for
Less Than FMV
A tissue bank's directors are obliged to manage its assets in an in-
formed and responsible manner.415 This duty of care deters a tissue
bank's directors from carelessly dissipating these assets-which in-
clude the value of its tissue banking services-by selling them for less
than their FMV.416 (Judge Posner's approach to the ban on private
benefit performs the same function by incorporating the duty of care
into tax-exempt law. 41 7)
In practice, the duty of care simply reminds directors to do what
they already do-try to serve their organization's best interests. To
better serve its charitable mission, a rational tissue bank will seek nor-
mal and even supernormal profits.418 In Professor Colombo's view,
patently non-FMV transactions between nonprofit organizations and
unrelated outsiders are rare. He believes that when a nonprofit
grossly overpays or undercharges a seemingly unrelated outsider,
"there has got to be a 'connection' somewhere"-some insiders must
be manipulating the charity to serve their private interests.419 Other-
wise, he said, "it's just stupidity," for why else "would someone give
away assets to an unrelated party?" 420
b. What Steps Must Tissue Banks Take to Prevent Processors
From Selling Tissue?
Tax-exempt law restricts the private benefits that an EO's charitable
activity may confer. This section asks what steps, if any, a tissue bank
must take to prevent for-profit transferees from capturing the eco-
nomic value of transferred tissues.421
i. The opportunity to capture the economic value of donated tissue
is valuable
The private benefit doctrine restricts EOs from engaging in charita-
ble activity that excessively benefits noncharitable parties. This doc-
415. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.
416. The tissue bank that charges too little for its services must be distinguished from the
tissue bank that charges zero dollars for raw tissue, as NOTA requires it to do.
417. See supra notes 376-378 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 384-391 and accompanying text.
419. E-mail from John D. Colombo, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law,
to Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis (Aug. 21, 2005, 19:59 EST) (on file with author).
420. Id.
421. See infra notes 432-433 and accompanying text.
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trine may seem irrelevant to the nonprofit tissue bank that transfers
tissue to for-profit processors in exchange for the FMV of its services.
On paper, this is an even trade. In practice, however, the for-profit
processor gets the better end of the bargain: it gains an opportunity to
sell the transferred tissue (capture its economic value). This opportu-
nity is valuable-even though the processor must violate NOTA to
seize it.422
For-profit processors may value the opportunity to sell donated tis-
sue more highly than nonprofit tissue banks. As compared to tissue
banks, processors (both for-profit and nonprofit) can more easily ex-
ploit imperfectly competitive markets to earn supernormal profits.
For example, many processors promote their products by using dis-
tinctive trademarks such as Grafton and Osteofil.423 Such branding
enables these processors to charge loyal customers a premium. 424 Tis-
sue banks, by contrast, generally do not affix brand names to the raw
tissues.
Additionally, for-profit processors may have greater incentives and
fewer inhibitions about extracting wealth from donated tissue, as com-
pared to nonprofit processors and tissue banks. For-profit businesses
generally seek to maximize their profits.425 Nonprofit entities, by con-
trast, tend to be driven by nonpecuniary missions, which may temper
the imperative to maximize profits. 426 A nonprofit's controllers may
also have less incentive to maximize profits because of the nondis-
tribution constraint, which bars them from appropriating the entity's
422. An economic analysis of criminal behavior predicts that a rational utility maximizer will
prefer to engage in a criminal act if the expected payoff from committing the offense exceeds the
expected punishment. See, e.g., Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 345, 345-46 (1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/8100book.pdf. The
low probability of incurring sanctions for violating NOTA increases the rational actor's expected
value of violating the Act, as does the relatively mild penalties for violating the Act-50,000
fine and five years' imprisonment. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2000).
423. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 261-268 and accompanying text.
425. See, e.g., OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, http://
www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=T104.e1351 (last visited
Jan. 12, 2006) ("As long as the revenue gained from an additional unit of output exceeds its cost,
the firm has an interest in continuing production."); see also OXFORD REFERENCE ONLINE, A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, http://www.oxfordreference.comlviews/ENTRY.html?subview=
main&entry=T19.e2471 (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (defining "profit maximization" and asserting
that "[o]ther things being equal ... businesses prefer higher profits to lower"). But see id. (defin-
ing "profit maximization" and asserting that "the directors or owners [of a business] may have
their own objectives: these range from desire for an easy life, a large empire, or jobs for their
relatives, to a reputation as patrons of the arts, sport, or the environment. All these have to be
traded off against profits.").
426. See supra notes 306-309, 315-327 and accompanying text.
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profits (except as reasonable compensation). 427 There is some evi-
dence to support this prediction: Kevin Cmunt, an AlloSource official,
stated that nonprofit processors such as AlloSource are less likely
than for-profit processors to raise prices in response to tissue
shortages. 428
ii. NOTA-compliant tissue banks transfer this opportunity to for-
profit processors
When for-profit processors obtain donated tissue from NOTA-com-
pliant tissue banks, they thereby acquire an opportunity to capture the
tissue's value-albeit by violating the Act.429 This result implicates
the private benefit doctrine. Although the illicit opportunity to earn
profits is valuable, do tissue banks violate the doctrine by conveying
this opportunity to for-profit processors? Each formulation of the pri-
vate benefit doctrine would analyze the question differently.
In United Cancer Council, Judge Posner associated private benefit
with careless directors who enrich third parties by wasting corporate
assets. 430 But that is not what happens here. In our scenario, dutiful
directors pass up and pass along an opportunity to capture charitable
resources, as NOTA demands they do. The tax court in American
Campaign Academy associated private benefit with directors that tar-
get the secondary benefits of their organization's charitable activity
towards a particular private party.431 That is not what happens here
either. An independent tissue bank does not target an economic ben-
efit-the opportunity to earn profits by selling donated tissue-to an-
yone in particular. Rather, the tissue bank transfers this benefit
indiscriminately to whoever obtains its tissues.
On its face, the IRS's approach might permit a finding of prohibited
private benefit in such transactions. In its strictest formulation, this
approach prohibits charitable activity that generates secondary private
interests if these private benefits are avoidable (qualitatively
nonincidental). 432 In one sense, a NOTA-compliant tissue bank can-
not avoid giving transferees the opportunity to sell the transferred tis-
sues. At the same time, a tissue bank can arrange for processing
wAith-j1 conferring thi s benefit on fnr_nrnf t prnoessors Thre are at
427. See supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
429. I will assume that an EO, by transferring this opportunity to a for-profit firm, thereby
advances private interests within the meaning of tax-exempt law's private benefit doctrine.
430. See supra notes 368-378 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 360-367 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 342-349 and accompanying text.
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least two ways to do this. A tissue bank can deal exclusively with
nonprofit processors such as MTF and AlloSource. Alternatively, a
tissue bank can contract with for-profit processors instead of transfer-
ring the tissue outright and with no strings attached. This enables the
tissue bank to rein in the processor's profit margin.433
The surest way to avoid private benefit is to stop supplying for-
profit processors with raw tissue. This is precisely what the State of
California invites individual tissue donors to do-withhold consent for
for-profit processors to touch the tissue they donate.434 Yet if non-
profit tissue banks did this en masse, they would harm would-be al-
lograft recipients by creating "a vacuum in the market for the kinds of
products for-profit companies make using donated tissue. '435 It
would make the tissue industry less efficient and innovative by driving
away for-profit capital and entrepreneurialism. It would also prevent
some tissue banks from furthering their charitable goals by partnering
with for-profit firms.436
A nonprofit tissue bank exists, inter alia, to promote health through
allograft implantations. In pursuing that goal, a tissue bank may en-
able an unrelated for-profit processor to gain an edge over its compet-
itors-for example, by entering a long-term contract to supply that
processor with tissue. Yet conferring these secondary benefits is not
part of the tissue bank's raison d'itre unless it is controlled by the for-
profit beneficiary. This fact rules out private benefit under the tax
court's approach in American Campaign Academy.437 This result is
eminently sensible. Although the IRS's approach technically might
permit a private benefit argument, that argument is refuted by the
substantial public benefits that flow from for-profit involvement in the
tissue industry. 438
433. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
435. See Boden Comments, supra note 14, at 27. Boden further explained:
Each year, donated tissue is utilized in thousands of musculoskeletal surgeries to allevi-
ate pain and restore a patient's range of motion. This would not be possible without
the generous gift of tissue donation, and the enhancement of that gift through the com-
plex technologies developed by for-profit entities in the tissue banking community.
Id. (emphasis added).
436. See, e.g., supra notes 410-412 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 360-367, 431 and accompanying text.
438. I thank John Colombo for his assistance in articulating this point.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many processors are for-profit businesses, 43 9 and they obtain their
basic inputs through altruistic donations to nonprofit tissue banks.440
Some people are troubled by the fact that for-profit firms earn profits
by processing donated tissue (or would be troubled if they knew),44 1
and some industry actors prefer not to publicize this fact. 44 2  If
NOTA's scheme were followed, however, the apparent tension be-
tween selflessness and self-interest in the tissue industry would disap-
pear. Allograft recipients would capture the economic value of
donated tissue, thereby realizing the donors' philanthropic goals. At
the same time, intermediaries would be fairly compensated for adding
value to donated tissue, and thus adequately incentivized to produce
allografts for implantation. 443 In such circumstances, it is perfectly ap-
propriate for for-profit actors in the tissue industry to earn (normal)
profits.
In reality, NOTA is flawed in both design and execution. Its
scheme for redistributing value from donors to recipients is unwieldy
if not implausible. Many intermediaries stand between donors and
recipients-tissue banks, processors, health care providers, and firms
that distribute allografts to these providers. For the Act to succeed,
each intermediary must transfer or re-gift the tissue's economic value
intact to the next intermediary until it is distributed to the recipients.
That is unlikely to happen.
Public authorities do not enforce the Act, 4 4 4 and the markets for
donated tissue and allografts are imperfectly competitive. 445 These
conditions thwart the donors' altruistic aims by permitting in-
termediaries, not allograft recipients, to capture the tissue's value.
Moreover, NOTA's economic premises are undercut insofar as intel-
lectual property law lets processors earn monopolistic rents from pat-
ented technology. 446
Karl Llewellyn, the great University of Chicago law professor, "is
said to have said, 'Technique without morals is a menace; but morals
439. See supra notes i33-i35 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 3-4, 102-110, 117 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
442. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 24, 64-66, 203-207 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 227-268, 405-409 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 249-260 and accompanying text.
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without technique is a mess.' ,,447 Although NOTA and charity law
share certain moral goals, charity law pursues these in a more
methodical way. NOTA looks rather messy by comparison and yields
results that some find alarming. The remainder of this Article identi-
fies lessons to be learned from using charity law to advance NOTA's
goals. It then considers our moral goals for tissue transplantation and
techniques for achieving them.
A. Charity Law's Lessons for NOTA and Vice Versa
Charity law can be used to advance NOTA's and tissue donors'
philanthropic goals. At least one nonprofit tissue bank, RTI Donor
Services, is controlled by a for-profit processor, RTI. By enforcing the
nondistribution constraint, state authorities can deter a for-profit par-
ent from siphoning off a nonprofit subsidiary's profits for private gain.
If RTI Donor Services, a taxable entity, were also required to be tax-
exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), the IRS could supplement state su-
pervision by enforcing the ban on private inurement. The IRS could
also enforce the ban on private benefit, and thereby deter more subtle
means of exploiting captive tissue banks.
A charity law analysis of the tissue industry illustrates the limits of
charity law's ability to safeguard charitable resources. Charity law can
do relatively little to prevent for-profit processors from capturing the
economic value of tissue they obtain through arm's length transactions
with unrelated tissue banks.448 Once a noncharitable party acquires
raw tissue with no strings attached, charity law loses jurisdiction over
the tissue and the noncharitable parties that handle it. At that point,
only NOTA and self-control prevent the transferees from exploiting
tissue for private gain. This is troubling because for-profit processors
are (all things being equal) more likely than nonprofit entities to act in
this manner.449
Applying charity law to the tissue industry also identifies potential
problems within charity law. The private benefit doctrine restricts the
ability of tax-exempt organizations to benefit private interests.450 This
restriction draws attention to how NOTA-compliant tissue banks con-
fer a benefit on for-profit transferees-the opportunity to capture the
447. Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism 6 (U. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Eco-
nomics, Working Paper No. 245, 2005), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
WkngPprs_226-50/245-crs-progressivism.pdf.
448. See supra notes 421-428 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 306-309, 423-428 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 328-378 and accompanying text.
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tissue's economic value. 451 The surest way for tissue banks to prevent
this is to deal exclusively with nonprofit processors, but this approach
would harm the health of potential allograft recipients. 452
A charity law analysis of NOTA draws attention to the Act's dis-
tinct moral concerns. It prohibits tissue sales by any party, be it non-
profit or for-profit. The Act's indifference to legal form reflects its
peculiar understanding of exploitation. For NOTA, the relevant re-
source-cadaveric tissue-is exploited by commodifying it. On this
view, any intermediary that sells tissue is an enemy: its status as a
nonprofit or for-profit entity is irrelevant. For charity law, by con-
trast, the relevant resources-charitable assets-are exploited when
they are siphoned off or excessively applied for private gain. The non-
profit form is designed to reduce the risk of such exploitation. Lastly,
this analysis underscores weaknesses in NOTA's scheme for realizing
its philanthropic goals. The Act prohibits everybody-and nobody in
particular-from selling tissue. It imposes no duty on tissue transfer-
ors to block transferees from violating its restrictions.453 Charity law,
by contrast, imposes special duties on a distinct class of entities-non-
profit organizations-to advance charitable ends and steward charita-
ble resources.
B. What Is to Be Done?
The most pressing normative question for the tissue industry is not
whether cadaveric tissue should be sold, but who should capture its
value. Under the current regime, intermediaries-especially for-
profit processors-are likely to capture the value of donated tissue,
not allograft recipients. If this result is morally objectionable, a better
alternative must be identified. If not processors, who then should cap-
ture the tissue's value, and how can redistribution be achieved? In
evaluating the alternatives, the full range of NOTA's goals and con-
cerns must be considered, and any prescription must be partial and
qualified. By furthering one of these goals more fully, others might be
hindered or foiled. Here are four possible ways to proceed.
I. Enforce ANOTA
If NOTA were enforced effectively, recipients would pay less for
allografts made from donated tissue and thereby capture the tissue's
value. To this end, regulators could be appointed to set reasonable
451. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 429-436 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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rates of return for for-profit processors, and to cap allograft prices to
keep firms from exceeding these rates.
2. Revoke NOTA
Instead of attempting to enforce NOTA, we might consider revok-
ing it-at least as it applies to cadaveric tissue used in transplantation.
Under the current regime, a decedent's next of kin have two choices:
to agree or refuse to donate the decedent's tissue. Under a free mar-
ket approach, the next of kin would have another choice: they could
sell the tissue and capture its economic value for themselves. This
approach commodifies tissue, which NOTA opposes. That said, a free
market in cadaveric tissue could promote health by increasing the sup-
ply of such tissue, and thus the number of people who can benefit
from allografts. 454 Because this market would be limited to cadaveric
tissue, living persons in desperate straits would still be barred from
selling their bones, skin, heart valves, and other tissues.
A market approach to procuring raw tissue would dilute the altruis-
tic sensibility that currently infuses much of the tissue industry. Even
so, this approach need not purge altruism from the industry. Individu-
als could still choose to donate tissue. Moreover, revoking NOTA
would help some donors advance their altruistic goals more effec-
tively. When someone donates tissue, he or she runs the risk that a
for-profit processor will capture its economic value. A shrewd altruist
could reduce this risk by selling cadaveric tissue and donating the pro-
ceeds to a nonprofit tissue bank. In this way, an altruist could be
more certain that the proceeds will be used to benefit allograft
recipients.
3. Permit Nonprofit Tissue Banks to Sell Donated Tissue to For-
Profit Processors455
Enforcing or revoking NOTA are not the only choices. There is
another option: modify the Act to permit nonprofit tissue banks to sell
454. See supra notes 232-238 and accompanying text.
455. Agnos suggested that
[a]s an extension of charitable trust doctrine and in recognition of the altruistic nature
of gifts of human tissue, require payments by for-profit tissue companies for tissue
received from nonprofit tissue banks to be based on the fair market value of the tissue.
Require proceeds from the sale of tissue by nonprofit tissue banks to private tissue
companies that are beyond the bank's costs of acquiring, storing, processing and
transferring the tissue to be placed in a charitable trust, and used for charitable
purposes. These could include education on the tissue donation process and / or
making tissue products and procedures available for uninsured and underinsured
populations.
AGNOS, supra note 89, at 24.
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donated tissue to for-profit processors.456 In other words, nonprofit
tissue banks could be exempted from the Act's "reasonable pay-
ments" cap on compensation for intermediaries. This would authorize
tissue banks to earn supernormal profits when transacting with for-
profit processors. This measure could redistribute the economic value
of donated tissue from for-profit processors to nonprofit tissue banks.
This option builds upon the observation that a shrewd altruist might
prefer to sell tissue and donate the proceeds. Granted, cadaveric tis-
sue would be commodified if nonprofit tissue banks were to sell it to
for-profit processors. Yet commodification in this context need not
dishonor or exploit donor altruism. To the contrary, it may advance a
donor's altruistic aims more effectively than the status quo. Under
current conditions, the tissue industry is not a secure vehicle for deliv-
ering the economic value of donated tissue to allograft recipients. In-
stead, it facilitates-if not invites-for-profit businesses to
appropriate this value for private gain. As between nonprofit tissue
banks and for-profit businesses, altruistic donors would likely want
the former to capture the tissue's value.
This change could have significant and beneficial consequences. As
nonprofit organizations, tissue banks must use any new income to ad-
vance their charitable missions and finance their services. They could
use the additional resources to exhort the public to make anatomical
gifts, educate them about transplantation, provide aftercare for donor
families, and improve the quality of their facilities.45 7 If the tissue
bank is also an OPO, it could use tissue banking revenues to cross-
subsidize its organ procurement activities. 458
Exempting nonprofits from NOTA's prohibition need not hamper
the goal of promoting health. Nonprofit tissue banks could also use
additional resources to develop and distribute allografts that serve
medical rather than cosmetic needs. 459 Granted, for-profit business
will find processing to be less lucrative, as they could earn only normal
profits instead of supernormal profits. Even so, this reduction need
not drive for-profit processors out of the tissue industry. By defini-
tion, supernormal profits are profits that exceed what is necessary to
;nduce a business to re--n w1thn ,n idstrir 460 hereas normal
456. More generally, NOTA could be revised to permit nonprofit intermediaries in the tissue
industry (e.g., nonprofit tissue banks and processors) to sell tissue to for-profit intermediaries
(e.g., for-profit processors and distributors).
457. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 387-391 and accompanying text.
459. See, e.g., supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
460. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
2006] 1013
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
profits are profits that suffice to induce businesses to continue their
current activities. 461
Exempting nonprofits from NOTA could also advance the Act's
goal of promoting fairer access to body parts for transplantation. Tis-
sue banks could use additional resources to subsidize allografts for
people who need but cannot afford them. This change need not in-
crease the prices for allografts. Because processors do not require su-
pernormal profits to stay in the tissue industry, they might settle for
smaller profits (but not less than normal profits), rather than pass on
their increased costs to recipients. The Act would still bar individuals
from selling tissue. It would thus continue to protect poor people
from endangering themselves by selling body parts.
4. Preserve the Status Quo
Before making any changes, we should consider the advantages of
the status quo. By letting for-profit processors earn supernormal prof-
its, the status quo gives businesses more incentive and resources to
develop more innovative and safer allografts. Although commodifica-
tion occurs under the current regime, it is partly concealed from pub-
lic view. This is achieved by interposing nonprofit tissue banks
between altruistic donors and profit-maximizing processors. This ad-
ded degree of separation puts a better face on the transaction, and
explains why for-profit RTI went through the trouble to create non-
profit RTI Donor Services-"because it is appropriate for a nonprofit
entity to approach families about donation [of a loved one's tissues],
especially since families are being asked to donate for humanitarian
reasons. ' 462 If NOTA authorized tissue banks to sell tissue to for-
profit processors, the commodification inherent in today's tissue in-
dustry would be harder to conceal. This might deter people from be-
coming donors. Even so, a conscious policy of concealing from donors
tissue sales by for-profit firms may itself raise ethical problems.
C. Is the Status Quo Tenable?
The tissue industry relies on altruistic individuals to donate material
whose subjective value is intensely personal and even sacral. The fact
that for-profit businesses use this material for private gain raises spe-
cial concerns, and these may become more urgent in the future. As
scientists develop new ways to use cadaveric tissue to enhance and
save lives, the demand for tissue will inevitably rise. At present, the
461. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
462. Flatten, supra note 185 (quoting RTI's Wendy Crites Wacker).
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industry thrives because of public ignorance and indifference regard-
ing for-profit involvement: most donors are either unaware of such
involvement or it does not trouble them enough to stop donating. If
potential donors become more informed and indignant, however, they
could stifle the industry's growth by refusing to supply enough tissue
to meet its expanding needs. If that occurs, the government or indus-
try actors will be pressed to address donor concerns in order to ensure
the health of both the industry and potential allograft recipients. It is
ironic that by its very success, the tissue industry has exacerbated the
tension between the selflessness that motivates its donors and the self-
interest that drives its for-profit actors.
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